Hegemony, Consciousness, and Political Change in Peru

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> [The great mass] has, for reasons of submission and intellectual subordination, adopted a conception [of the world] which is not its own but is borrowed from another group... this is the conception which it follows in 'normal times'... when its conduct is not independent and autonomous, but submissive and subordinate.—Antonio Gramsci, *Selections from the Prison Notebooks*

There is nothing more controversial in Gramsci's writing than his notion that the subordination of workers is in "normal times" not merely social and political but also intellectual and that workers' "very conception of the world" is distorted by the dominant classes and their intellectuals.[1] In a sense, Gramsci is echoing Marx and Engels when they wrote in *The German Ideology* that "the class which has the means of material production at its disposal, has control at the same time over the means of mental production, so that thereby, generally speaking, the ideas of those who lack the means of mental production are subject to it."[2] Still for the most part, Marx and Engels treated the rise of revolutionary consciousness as an unproblematic result of the extremes of division of labor and immiserization of the working class in advanced capitalist society.

Later Marxist writers, including those of the stature of Marcuse and Habermas, have followed in the tradition of Gramsci, but many others of our era have recoiled from this element of the concept of hegemony. Fraught with difficulties, the notion of intellectual or cultural domination of the oppressed is displaced by a more structural understanding of class domination. Workers are not fooled by the bourgeoisie's efforts at ideological mystification; their frequent quiescence

reflects organizational barriers to revolution, strategic calculation that rebellion would be fruitless, or the material or political co-opting of working-class leaders.

This essay argues for a return to some modified notion of hegemony, of class domination as including attempts by the dominant to influence the conceptions of the world of the dominated—attempts that may, in normal times, meet with some success. The essay draws from materials reflecting the complex and contradictory quality of lower-class political and social consciousness in contemporary Peru. My purpose is not to cast doubt on the importance of various sorts of structural barriers to resistance. Still the views and understandings of lower-class actors—of authority, the state, and the nature of a just society among others—can propel these actors toward protest or acquiescence. Furthermore in "normal times" these understandings bear the mark of the values and perspectives of the dominant classes.

Before turning to an analysis of lower-class politics in Peru, it will be useful to look more closely at the case against hegemony. James Scott's *Weapons of the Weak* is a recent example of a structuralist position made with force and cogency.[3] The discussion that follows focuses on Scott's work. But the implication of his study—that the emergence of lower-class resistance or revolutionary action is unrelated to changes in "ideology" or consciousness—is common to several influential recent studies.[4] The critique that follows is intended to go beyond Scott's work and suggests a refocusing on consciousness and mentalities in the study of social movements.

SCOTT AND THE CASE AGAINST HEGEMONY

In exploring social relations in rural Malaysia, Scott provides extensive evidence of poor peasants' deep "penetration" or understanding of the mystifications and ideological glosses of the rich. The poor are not fooled, for instance, when ritualized gift-giving and liberality are publicly "euphemized" as symbols of spontaneous generosity; poor peasants recognize these mechanisms of social domination and control for what they are.[5] Their deference to the "public transcript," which elevates domination to the higher moral plane of justice and generosity, is merely strategic. Outside the sphere of power where the "hidden transcript" of the poor reigns such glosses are the objects of derision and critical reinterpretations.

Scott's case against hegemony has a certain *a priori* populist appeal. He underscores the apparent elitism of those who see the poor and weak as mystified by the ideological manipulations of the rich and powerful; to note the ways in which the poor see through their oppressors' smokescreens is to vindicate the intelligence and strategic sense of the weak. "It is perhaps not entirely surprising" Scott inserts in a footnote, "that intellectuals further removed from political

combat and from the working class itself have fastened on analysis that ascribes a nearly coercive influence to the product of their own class, that is, ideology!"[6]

The concept of "false consciousness," which is sometimes invoked to explain why the poor and oppressed are unable to identify and to act on their own interests, would seem particularly fraught with elitism especially when the analyst claims a more clear-eyed sense of these interests than that of the lower-class actors themselves. Worse, the suspicion arises that intellectuals who describe the oppressed as the victims of false consciousness or consciousness that is in some other way defective are in fact perpetuating the ideological vision of the dominant classes who justify social hierarchy as based on a natural or cultural hierarchy: the poor are poor because they are stupid or ill-educated, and therefore more given to misinterpretations of the conditions of their lives.

Despite its anti-elitist appeal, Scott's view that the poor villagers of Sedaka, and dominated groups in general, are not subject to hegemonic ideologies itself raises difficult problems. First he is left with the problem of explaining the purpose of ideological "euphemizations": If they do not fulfill their most obvious role of shoring up relations of domination by making these appear just, inevitable, or in some other way palatable in the minds of the oppressed, why do the dominant classes bother with them? The question is especially germane because Scott recognizes that euphemizations are costly, involving the expenditure of time and profits by rich peasants who must cultivate the poor socially and contribute materially to their well being, through charity, loans, or liberality.

In part Scott's resolution to the paradox of euphemization involves the inertia of the normative "underpinnings" of the social relations of production. In rural Malaysia the Green Revolution's shift toward more capitalistic forms of production has brought about a disjuncture between the agrarian paternalism of the past and the more impersonal productive relations of the present; rich peasants remain under the sway of older norms and values. "[W]ealthy farmers are themselves the product of the earlier agrarian system and the normative ideas that underpinned it."[7]

But this formulation is less than convincing. It fails to explain why, under the previous system of production, the social relations of production were in need of any "normative underpinnings" that appear like the sort of ideological props that Scott views as nonexistent in the present. Indeed there is a tension between Scott's structuralism and the very notion of "normative underpinnings" of production relations. By appealing to the notion of the inertia of norms and values associated with the social relations of production, Scott merely begs the question of the relation between the two.

Scott's more serious answer to the paradox of euphemization is that it is not the poor but rather the rich who are taken in. The objects of the "public transcript" of ideologically motivated glosses and slights of hand are not the poor but instead

the rich themselves. In appealing to the self-interested versions that rich peasants produce of the causes and extent of inequality in land holdings or of the motives lying behind public displays of charity, the poor are merely appeasing the vanity and need for self-justification of the rich. Scott's interpretation of the interplay between Hamzah, a poor peasant, and Haji Kadir,his employer, suggests this view of the true purpose of euphemization.

> Hamzah knows that Haji Kadir is in a position to provide him with, say, work or a loan against future wages. He also knows that Haji Kadir and others like him have typically described such actions in terms of help (*tolong*) or assistance (*bantuan*). Hamzah then *uses* this knowledge to pursue his concrete ends; he approaches Haji Kadir, using all the appropriate linguistic forms of deference and politeness, and requests his "help" and "assistance." In other words he appeals to the self-interested description that Haji Kadir would give of his own acts to place them in the most advantageous light....Just who is manipulating whom in this petty enterprise is no simple matter to decide.[8]

The difficulty with such a view lies in the asymmetry that it ascribes to the dominant and the dominated in their ability to act strategically, their capacity to see through the smokescreen of ideological manipulation, or their tendency to be motivated by self-images that bear a questionable relation to reality. If Scott has freed himself from the condescension toward the poor that he suggests is contained in notions of hegemony, that condescension is transferred to the rich. The poor are liberated from the role of dupes just as the rich inherit it.

The consciousness of poor peasants in Scott's view then is a fairly unproblematic reflection of social relations of production and political relations of domination in which their daily lives are embedded. In the vast majority of historical situations, the poor acquiesce, he suggests, because of the "dull compulsion of everyday life"; they display a "pragmatic resignation," a "more or less rational understanding of what is achievable in a given situation,"[9] a sharp appreciation of the "risks of open defiance."[10] The symbolic and piecemeal resistance to the small oppressions of everyday life is a pragmatic response to real constraints and not—Scott holds—a victory of dominant ideology in transforming the contingent into the inevitable. The poor peasants of Sedaka have tried to resist combine-harvesters, but have failed; when they express a tone of resignation "they are merely expressing a realistic, pragmatic, view of the situation as they experience it."[11]

Implicit in this view, and made explicit at the end of the study, is that pragmatic resignation in the face of oppressive social and political relations is the best attitude of mind that the poor can adopt; aspirations for a larger challenge to power would be quixotic. Footdragging, theft, and malicious gossip become the ultimate forms of individual lower-class resistance; millenialism and ritual reversal, its ultimate social forms.

CHALLENGES FOR HEGEMONY

The preliminary discussion in this article served to outline the basic argument against the view that hegemony, in a Gramscian sense, constitutes an important barrier to lower-class resistance and rebellion. It also highlighted the challenge to those who believe that this structuralist, antihegemony position is wrong or who believe at least that it is worth exploring the patterns of consciousness or mentalities of lower-class actors and that one can expect to find there something more than a strategic reading of what a structural situation allows. Let me briefly enumerate those challenges:

Hegemony versus Dissimulation

Scott's work appropriately alerts us to the possible confusion of public expressions of deference to upper-class ideology by the poor and oppressed on the one hand and to their real, authentic internalizing of dominant ideology on the other. How can we distinguish one from the other? Scott's enjoinder to listen to lower-class discourse outside of "spheres of power" and to cock one's ear not only to the "public transcript" but also to the "hidden transcript" may make this methodological difficulty sound more tractable than it really is. Is "power" really to be thought of as like the shade: either you are in it or you are out of it? Even inside the slave quarters, to adopt one of Scott's examples, won't gender, age, experience, or even force of personality introduce currents of domination and subordination? How does a first-world researcher escape representing "power" in a poor third-world community? Nevertheless a sensitivity to dissimulation, to deference as a pose, goes some way toward allowing us to avoid mistaking these for the real operation of hegemony.

Acquiescence versus Pragmatism

Relatedly Scott's study alerts us to the possibility that what appears as heart-felt acquiescence may be nothing more than a realistic response to very long odds on the success of anything more rebellious. If those deferring to power do so not because they see it as legitimate but only as inevitable and if that sense of inevitability comes from the experience of failure (or at least from a reasonably realistic expectation of failure), we should be wary of concluding that hegemony is at work. (Scott acknowledges that a sense of the inevitability of a given social order is in itself insufficient evidence to conclude that hegemony is not at work since surely that very sense could constitute the victory of upper-class discourse over lower-class thinking.)

Respect for Lower-Class Actors' Self-Understandings

To suggest as I have that there may be difficulties in the apparent anti-elitism of the denial of hegemony—that is, of the insistence that the poor and oppressed see perfectly clearly through the mist of upper-class ideology—is not to dismiss the matter of elitism out of hand. If one takes the idea of hegemony seriously, one must be prepared at some point to adopt the view that the powerful have successfully inserted themselves and their interests into the processes by which the weak understand themselves, their goals, their possibilities, and their constraints. But that point need not come very early. To leave room for hegemony while at the same time taking seriously the perceptions and beliefs of the poor is to strike a difficult balance but a worthy one.

Furthermore it should become clear in the following section that the self-presentations of lower-class actors may present some uncomfortable evidence for those who would like to argue against hegemony; under some circumstances it is structuralists like Scott who would seem to find themselves in the position of denying the validity of lower-class self-understandings. Thus in situations where patterns of consciousness change, when the poor move from acquiescence to resistance, from "hegemonized" to rebellious consciousness, one would expect to find a self-understanding of that process. What is the analyst to make of a poor squatter who says that once she thought of priests as authorities to respect but now sees that they are people just like her? Or of another who says that before she thought that if she spoke in public her words would sound "stupid," but now she knows that she can speak as well as anyone? Such accounts turn the table on those who identify the concept of hegemony with "false consciousness" and decry the inevitable condescension of both.

RESISTANCE AND ACQUIESCENCE IN A LIMA SHANTYTOWN

In late May, 1986, officials from the neighborhood of Condorcanqui[12] called a meeting, an "open assembly," to discuss the absence of running water in their neighborhood and to announce a march the next week to the offices of SEDAPAL, the municipal water authority. Condorcanqui is a subsection or neighborhood of Independencia, a shantytown community of 180,000 in the northern section of Lima.[13] Independencia has its own mayor and district council, elected every three years since the return to civilian rule in Peru in 1980. Several district councilors had helped neighborhood leaders in Condorcanqui to organize the assembly and planned to speak to the crowd that was slowly taking shape that drizzly early winter afternoon; the district's mayor also planned to give a speech.

I drove with three members of the mayor's staff, the young daughter of two of them, and the mayor's sister, a community organizer, to Condorcanqui. As we ascended along one of the district's few paved roads, the air turned damper and more opaque. When we reached the fork in the road where the speakers' platform

had been set up, our ears were popping from the altitude; Condorcanqui, in many ways a typical Lima *barriada* or shantytown, was perched so high up in the Andean foothills that it almost took on the appearance of a highland community.

We arrived at 3:30 PM. About 200 people stood around the speakers' platform, silent or conversing quietly in small groups. Many held signs or small banners: "28 of July District Council," "Association of Popular Dininghalls of Sarita Colonia," "Mixed Commission of Condorcanqui." On the platform itself stood a dozen people, leaders of local organizations. Prominent among them was a district council member, a stocky man in his mid-30s who had grown up in the lower climes of the district, closer to the main highway connecting it with central Lima.

Shortly after we arrived, a young woman began the assembly, welcoming those gathered and reading a list of the event's cosponsors. She looked up briefly when a camouflage-green police truck parked next to the platform, disgorging five officers of the civil guard and their captain. Billy clubs and pistols hung prominently from their belts. The captain was young and had an extremely angry expression on his face; he ascended the platform while the other *guardias* milled in two groups among the crowd.

The captain, quickly encircled by the leaders on the platform, began shouting: a state of emergency had been declared and the assembly had to disperse; they had no permission to hold the assembly, and it would be broken up by force if necessary. Indeed two weeks earlier a high national official of the ruling party, Alianza Popular Revolucionaria Americana (APRA), had barely escaped an assassination attempt, presumably by Sendero Luminoso guerrillas. The government had responded by imposing a state of emergency that greatly restricted public meetings. The district councilman responded, equally aroused, that the organizers had received permission from the *comandante* at the Civil Guard commissary. The captain left in the truck, saying that he was going to see if this was true.

The five *guardias* he had left behind had by now moved to the periphery of the crowd and had removed the billy clubs from their belts. The crowd seemed unintimidated; they did not leave in any visible numbers and listened attentively again as the speeches resumed.

When the captain returned 20 minutes later with a reinforcement of *guardias* the mayor herself was speaking, enjoining those assembled to march to the municipal water authority, SEDAPAL: "[W]e pay taxes, it is our right to have water." The *guardias* fanned out through the crowd waving billy clubs that swished menacingly through the air. Still most in the audience held their places, many with impassive expressions on their faces. On the platform, emotions ran high. The district councilman shouted "Repression! What's wrong with a meeting about water?"

In the neighborhood of Las Flores, south of Condorcanqui and about half the vertical distance lower—closer to the central highway, residents had also by the mid-1980s, expended much time and energy in an effort to obtain running water still without success. From 1982 until mid-1985 the effort was in the hands of Luis Cancho and Reynaldo Rojas, the secretary general and subsecretary, respectively, of the Las Flores Neighborhood Committee.

Cancho and Rojas seemed in many ways well suited for the task. Both had held leadership positions in Las Flores off and on for years; both had much experience maneuvering through the bureaucracies of the central government and the municipality of Greater Lima. They could claim some success, for instance, in having convinced a civil engineer from the national Housing Ministry to visit the neighborhood on his own time and draw up a map that allowed them to move their request for road leveling through the bureaucracy. In gratitude, the largest road through the neighborhood, which remained, like all Las Flores roads, unsealed, bore the engineer's name.

In their quest for a running water system, Las Flores's Water Commission (composed of Cancho and Rojas) used a similar approach. In their initial visits to SEDAPAL, they studiously learned the functionaries' names and used the names of other engineers and architects they had met in introducing themselves. Indeed their relations with officials took on the appearance of friendships—at least in Cancho's and Rojas' eyes. The water commissioners agreed with SEDAPAL officials that the residents of Las Flores would contribute money and labor to the water project, which involved opening a branch from a water main feeding off the nearby Rímac River. There was no need to consult with Las Flores residents regularly on these arrangements; the Commissioners felt confident that whatever arrangements they made would be accepted. Besides, as Rojas explained, it's the leader's job to "direct" (*conducir*) his constituents "in everything having to do with paperwork, and leave everything finished for them."

In fact, Cancho and Rojas's agreement with SEDAPAL provoked a revolt in the Las Flores Neighborhood Committee. According to the Water Commission's critics, Las Flores's residents were being asked to pay too much. To some, this was just one more piece of evidence that Cancho and Rojas were using their positions to display a kind of conspicuous consumption or status spending. "If the Secretary General feels capable of acting like a millionaire," one resident complained, "what's he doing here? Why doesn't he go live in San Isidro or Miraflores?"—elite neighborhoods of Lima. The debate over water exacerbated already existing tensions, but this time Cancho and Rojas's opponents took action: They formed a new Water Commission and began "negotiations" of their own with SEDAPAL, beginning with a boisterous march to the water utility's offices. Cancho and Rojas were perplexed; the actions of the new Water Commission

undermined their carefully cultivated friendships with SEDAPAL officials. Cancho complained that his friends, the SEDAPAL engineers, "say 'these people cry a lot, bother us a lot, you have to attend to them. [The new Water Commission] says let's go fight SEDAPAL, let's go shout.' How can we, the leaders, go shout at SEDAPAL? What would they say to us? We'd come off badly."

ALTERNATIVE STRATEGIES AND PATTERNS OF POLITICAL CONSCIOUSNESS

These vignettes show that there is more than one way to secure running water in Lima. That activists and leaders at some moments cultivated friendly, personalistic ties with government bureaucrats and at other times defied the police and shouted chants outside of government offices may not appear particularly surprising. But more is going on here than a pragmatic varying of strategies by cagey shantytown residents who have at their disposal a variety of strategic resources and practices. The differences between activists in Condorcanqui and Las Flores, and between the original and successor Water Commissions in Las Flores, in fact reflect a deep gulf in what might be called local political culture or worldviews.

Elsewhere I have given the names "clientelism" and "radicalism" to the distinct political worldviews motivating the strategies and practices illustrated in the previous section.[14] A central axis of difference around which these competing worldviews revolve is the subjective class identification of individuals, their level of class consciousness and solidarity. A strategic inclination to march in street demonstrations (rather than to ingratiate oneself with government officials) and to shout slogans outside ministries (rather than to engage in more sedate negotiations) was connected with a tendency to see themselves as members of the lower class or "popular sectors" (*sectores populares*). The discourse of more rebellious actors was peppered with expressions of lower-class consciousness. "We're poor people," said one such person, "that's what brings us together to fight."

Couched in the discourse of more clientelistic activists and community leaders, in contrast, was the subtle message that a distance separated them from the poor community around them. Sometimes this sense of distance became one of antagonism or hostility. Carlos Velásquez had once, as a young man, held a job as a bank teller. In the mid-1980s his bank days were well behind him, and he lived in a hovel high in the district's hills. The neighborhood was known as El Cielo, and Velásquez was in 1986 the president of El Cielo's Neighborhood Committee. In our conversations he frequently spoke of the need to maintain a certain style of dress ("you can't walk around with broken shoes") and standard of housing ("an employee can't live like a worker on the top of a hill") and of the desirability of avoiding lower-class establishments such as taverns or *cantinas*. Velásquez was concerned, as he put it, with his "social prestige" (*roce social*).

One evening our interview was interrupted by a neighbor, a woman who had come to Velásquez's house to place her name on a community register. The

woman's demeanor was deferential: She addressed him simply as "Señor" and looked at the ground as she spoke. After she left Velásquez complained of having to coax his constituents to act: "It's ignorance....They live like animals, it's true. So a leader has to fight, has to coax them like a child, like a baby."

Velásquez's and others' views of workers and the poor suggest an internalizing of views common among upper- and middle-class Peruvians. If his community does not advance, Velásquez implies, it is because of its members' ignorance, lack of motivation, and childlike qualities. In Velásquez's case, as in those of Cancho and Rojas, those holding these views exempted themselves from the defects inherent in the lower-class neighbors and co-workers.

In the case of those who represented the followers of these clientelistic leaders, hegemonized consciousness very often took the form of ascribing one's difficulties to individual circumstance, rather than to larger social causes; connected with this individualizing was an absence of a sense of shared oppression. This individualized worldview came out most clearly in discussions with confrontational local activists when they reflected on their own perceptions before they had been transformed into more assertive actors. Thus Laura Sánchez, an activist in Las Flores, explained the impact that taking part in a local women's club had on her:

> I began participating in [the Club's] meetings and since then started realizing that my problems are not mine alone, they exist at the district level or, you could say even—who knows?—at the world level. It's just that everyone is in his own place.

It is important to note that the class distinctions lying behind alternative strategic inclinations and practices, behind protest on the one hand and clientelism on the other, were more a matter of perception than they were of substance. Velásquez's background as a bank teller, which certainly would have placed him in the lower-middle class, was 20 years behind him at the time of my interviews; his income, the quality and location of his home, and the future prospects for his children—all of these located him squarely among the *sectores populares*. Luis Cancho was an unemployed machinist with ambitions of establishing a small *taller* or workshop in his home, but these ambitions had, as of mid-1986, come to nothing. Reynaldo Rojas was a poorly paid ticket-taker in a downtown movie theatre. Survey data from the district's voting population confirm the anecdotal evidence: Strategic inclinations and levels of class solidarity varied independently of occupational, income, or class differences to the extent that such differences existed in this basically lower-class community.[15]

A second element of the competing political subcultures or mentalities lying behind alternative strategies and practices involved views of conflict—both class and political. The worldview of those engaged in protest was suffused with a sense of conflict: Workers and owners held inevitably conflicting interests as did the

"popular sectors" and the Peruvian state or national government. Since interclass and political conflict was in the nature of things when such conflict was not manifest, it was being artificially masked. The most advantageous strategy available to the lower classes according to this view was to exacerbate the tensions between owner and worker or between the state and lower-class communities. In the latter case, one had to violate the rules of state/lower-class relations that government authorities tried to enforce:

> When you go and make demands (*reclamos*) before the central government, it makes them uncomfortable. Under no circumstances do they want poor people to go in a group to make demands. They get scared, it makes them uncomfortable, they prefer that only one or two leaders go to do the paperwork.

But to frighten and threaten owners and officials was the best way to extract resources or concessions.

For more clientelistic residents, conflict was not only avoidable but harmful: It risked dampening the goodwill of employers and bureaucrats on which any concessions for the shantytowns hung. This sense of assistance for shantytown communities as acts of individual goodwill was an extension of the perception of relations between the state and the poor as personal, even familial. Indeed clientelist discourse was permeated with descriptions of government officials as friends, "*compadres*," or family. As one leader explained his strategy in approaching a government ministry, "I tried to bother friends. I have good friends and, more than that, relatives who are professionals who will help me a lot."

The following vignettes further illustrate the conflicting attitudes of two shantytown residents toward a kind of ritualized "gift-giving" or material exchange that traditionally constituted one of the standard practices of interclass relations in Peru. What emerges clearly here is, again, the continued acceptance of the practices of paternalism among part of the population, at the same time that these practices had been challenged by another part.

By the mid-1980s, a plethora of "popular dining halls" had sprouted up in Lima's shantytowns, most organized and subsidized by the Catholic Church. By buying and preparing food collectively, groups of women could lower the cost of feeding their families.[16] The nuns and lay workers representing the socially activist wing of the Catholic Church were instrumental in organizing the dining halls. But these Church agents wished to do more than improve the diets of shantytown families. Under Church influence the organizations became forums for discussions that (as one nun put it) aimed at getting members to "become conscious" (*tomar conciencia*) of the causes and consequences of social inequality and of the virtues of challenging political authorities.

But the dining halls were also in some ways continuous with a tradition of Catholic charity in the shantytowns, and not all participants seemed to have made

the leap from what the religious activists called an "assistentialist" to a "participative" ethos. Virginia Verdera, a resident of the neighborhood of Colinas and the secretary of her neighborhood popular dining hall was one such member. Verdera's appearance and demeanor were distinctive in that they recalled, within the limits of her budget, that of a middle class woman, including carefully coifed hair. When her turn came to cook, she expressed considerable concern about the seasoning of the bulgur and fish or chicken dishes that were the normal popular dining-hall fare, a concern several other members saw as an affectation.

A nun living in Colinas opened a meeting of a federation of dining halls in December 1985 by explaining that two new dining halls had been formed and were now requesting admission to the federation. This expansion would mean smaller quotas of bread and dry goods for all of the member dining halls, but the nun encouraged the general membership not to deny entrance to the new groups. "We know that we are poor not because our society is poor, but because of an unequal distribution of resources. We should demonstrate equality here, just as we fight for it in society."

Verdera looked on unhappily, then spoke. "We're always getting less and less," she said. "It's almost Christmas and we'll eat less. I remember the old days when at Christmas the priests would come and give us *panetones* (fruitcakes)." Verdera was referring to the traditional gift, especially of factory owners to workers and of politicians to shantytown residents, which constituted almost a cliché of paternalistic "generosity" in Peru. Indeed before the era of socially oriented Church activism in this district and others like it, the priests who occasionally visited would—like politicians—distribute fruitcakes at Christmas time.

In the early 1970s, Peru's military government tried vigorously to change the structure and character of community organizations in the shantytowns of Lima and other cities.[17] As part of its effort to increase "participation" among Peru's peasants, workers, and urban poor, the regime instituted a pyramidal system of "Neighborhood Committees," which at its apex was tied to a special government agency, SINAMOS, whose portfolio included shantytown affairs. In districts with little prior community organization the Neighborhood Committees successfully increased participation and may have shored up support for the regime at least for a time. In more organized neighborhoods, SINAMOS often met with greater resistance. This was particularly true when SINAMOS found itself embroiled in longstanding conflicts among neighborhood groups.

Las Flores, where the district Mother's Club was locked in longstanding conflict with the Central Committee (the precursor to the Neighborhood Committee), was one such setting. In an immediate sense, the conflict in the early 1970s revolved around a building that the Mother's Club proposed to construct

with the help of Church funds (and also with the help of a very active young nun who had taken up residence in the *barrio*). The Central Committee leadership saw the building as a threat to their organization's preeminenence in the neighborhood; if the Club's building were to go up, it would have to be open to the community at large, and it would have to be administered by the Central Committee. The Mother's Club rejected these conditions, and the Central Committee had managed to block construction of the locale.

When SINAMOS operatives arrived in Las Flores in 1972 they established a neighborhood committee simply by changing the name and statutes of the Central Committee; the old Central Committee leadership was reelected under slightly new procedures and became the Las Flores Neighborhood Committee. For the Mother's Club members this identified SINAMOS as an enemy. María Romero, a Mother's Club activist from the period, recalled in our interviews the many ways that she and others sabotaged SINAMOS activities. When the SINAMOS organizer asked her and other club members to attend the swearing-in of the new Neighborhood Committee leaders, the women did not refuse, but did not attend. At a series of well-publicized SINAMOS-sponsored classes on fish processing the club was again absent.

But at the same time SINAMOS was in a position to grant the club permission to build its proposed locale, and Romero and other leaders approached the SINAMOS organizer several times to request permission to do so. Given the uncooperativeness of the club with SINAMOS programs, the organizer refused. On one occasion Romero tried to circumvent the SINAMOS organizer by buttonholing a military official in charge of Lima's northern districts who visited the area in a jeep ("Colonel what's his name" [*coronel no sé cuántos*] as she said with typical irreverence). Unaware of the background of the case, the colonel agreed (in writing) to the apparently innocuous idea that the Las Flores Mothers' Club should have a building. The SINAMOS organizer was furious and again blocked construction.

Tired of squabbling, the exasperated Romero offered the SINAMOS organizer a mock bribe and one that recalled her Andean highland origins:

> I said to him "[Y]ou know what Señor, I'm going to give you maybe even my pig" (I raised pigs back then), "I'm going to give you my pig so that you'll support us." I wasn't serious, of course I wouldn't give him anything, I said it just to see what he would say... I knew he wouldn't accept."

What is the meaning of a "gift" one offers without any intention of giving and without any expectation of its being accepted? It was clear that, by the time of the mock offer, Romero disliked the SINAMOS official intensely and was more interested in embarrassing him than in securing permission to construct the club building. Her way of embarrassing him was to suggest by a kind of active metaphor that his role in the community was that of a traditional patron; this was

a role that she knew he—the representative of a government whose self-proclaimed goal in the shantytowns was to effect a "revolution in participation"—would reject. When Romero insisted "I wasn't serious of course, I wouldn't give him anything...I knew he wouldn't accept," she was making clear that neither she nor he believed in the principles of patron/client ties that in a previous era would have given her "gift" the power to achieve certain results. (It would have demanded reciprocation, in the form of permission to build the locale.) She is not so much offering a pseudo-gift as making a joke, and a mocking joke at that, the barbed humor in which presupposes a disbelief in the tradition of clientelism that provides the joke with its terms. It is a joke that Virginia Verdera, the secretary of the Colinas popular dining hall, would never have made and is unlikely to have understood.

THE ORIGINS OF HEGEMONY AND COUNTER-HEGEMONY

Reflected in shantytown thought and practices is the persistence of hegemony in spite of an emerging counter-hegemony in Peru during the last two decades. This section presents evidence of the enforcing of hegemonic consciousness on the lower classes during the period known to Peruvian historiography as that of the "oligarchic state." It also explores the causes and consequences of a rising counter-hegemony, one with roots in the earlier period but one that bloomed with the decline of the oligarchic state.

Hegemony and the Oligarchic State

The term "oligarchic state" bespeaks the almost total control of politics by large mining, agricultural, and financial interests in Peru from the depression in the early 1930s to 1968. But it also suggests the penetration of these conservative forces into social and cultural spheres beyond the formal boundaries of the state. This oligarchic dominance sets Peru apart from many South American countries in the middle decades the twentieth century, where oligarchic control was more effectively challenged by populist movements. Peru had a strong populist party, APRA; but it failed to gain power in its early radical phase and became increasingly drawn into alliances with the oligarchy in the 1950s and 1960s. Among the effects of oligarchic control over the Peruvian state was a political economy unusually committed to open-market laissez-faire principles during much of the period when other countries were engaged in import-substitution industrialization.[18]

The oligarchic state relied for social control on a docile labor movement under APRA's influence, on an impoverished and unorganized peasantry, and on a poor urban mass in the ghettoes and shantytowns enmeshed in clientelistic ties with conservative political leaders. For my purposes it is important to note the existence of an ideological dimension to oligarchic dominance.

Indeed it is difficult to ignore a certain deference to upper-class values and self-perceptions at the very heart of APRA ideology. Even in its initial, more militant stage, APRA was a complex mix of seemingly contradictory elements, representing a tentative popular challenge to the oligarchic bloc at the same time that it reinforced lower-class subservience. APRA's initial organizers, many of them dissident members of the provincial elite or middle class, struck contradictory chords: They insisted on the brotherhood of workers in the APRA while simultaneously counseling deference to the Party's intelligentsia and technically qualified leaders. Haya de la Torre, APRA's founder and leader, displayed throughout his long career a great faith in technical solutions; APRA would "save Peru" as much through technocratic improvement as through organizing the popular masses.[19]

This deference to technocratic solutions and to the "professionals" who would dream them up and implement them found resonance among APRA's working-class base. Arturo Sabroso was an early *aprista* and textile union leader who helped impose this deference on more assertive workers. In an interview in the 1970s, he reflected on these internal struggles:

> A government totally made up of people from the proletariat was never considered as a possibility. Precisely when we became convinced of this a few fellow workers said, fine, we will join the Party, but fifty percent workers and fifty percent intellectuals in everything: deputies, senators, everything. Others of us reasoned that no, impossible to have half workers. In a parliamentary block you have to have professional men, technicians, doctors, engineers, economists, lawyers, professors, workers and employees. For study and consultation on many problems you need experts in their fields. This will assure that all the studies can be more effectively carried out.[20]

A certain hegemonic control was exercised in working-class residential districts during the period of the oligarchic state in large part by conservative politicians and dictators frustrated by APRA's hold over the labor movement. Luis M. Sánchez Cerro, an army lieutenant colonel, successfully ran against Haya de la Torre in presidential elections in 1931. His appeal centered around displays of paternalistic concern for the poor. According to Stein the candidate responded to poor supplicants:

> [B]y patting [them] on the back, writing down their names, and at times taking money from his pocket for them or even giving them articles of clothing from his own wardrobe. Always employing the *tu* form and speaking to them in simple language, he would say "Here you are my son, here you are my daughter. My son, my daughter, we'll see to everything."[21]

Two decades later the military dictator Manuel Odría (1948–1956) cultivated a following in San Martin de Porres, northwest of the city's colonial core; the dictator's wife, María Delgado, showered the residents with gifts of charity in a less-than-brilliant imitation of her contemporary, Evita Perón of Argentina.[22]

The oligarchic state used the public schools to inculcate deference to upper-class values and lifestyles. Lower-class students were trained well into this century with social etiquette (urbanity) manuals that included caste-like instructions: When social "inferiors" encountered their "superiors" on city streets, for example, the former should step aside. The most commonly used such manual made explicit its social philosophy:

> Urbanity greatly respects those categories established by nature, by society and by God himself, and therefore it obligates us to give preferential treatment to some people over others, according to their age, their social position, their rank, their authority and their character.[23]

Of course it is one thing for the oligarchic bloc to preach self-denial, respect for authority, and technical virtuosity—or in the cases of Sánchez Cerro and Odría to try to gloss state power as personal benevolence—and quite another for those who are being preached to to accept and internalize the sermon. It would be misguided to assume that these messages were never reinterpreted, inverted, or rejected outright. Still the popularity of Odría and Sánchez Cerro, attested to in the latter case by Sánchez Cerro's victory in the 1931 presidential election, an election that was fair and in which many workers voted, hints at the operation of hegemony. Arturo Sabroso's testimony speaks even more clearly: A member of what was in some senses the most militant part of the labor movement not only endorses the view of workers as incapable of independent political leadership but also imposes such a view on fellow workers.

The Decline of the Oligarchic State and the Rise of Counter-hegemony

Dramatic changes in the Peruvian state, political parties, and political culture in the late 1970s signified a broad challenge to the oligarchic state and oligarchic hegemony. Nevertheless it would be a mistake to suppose that the new sets of coalitions and actors constituting what might well be described as a popular bloc became hegemonic in the sense either of holding power or of defining the values, perspectives, and discourses of the whole society. Instead the period since the 1970s has been one of sharp inter- and intraclass conflict. This conflict was played out in Lima's shantytowns as much as it was in any other setting, and it forms the backdrop for the competing practices and worldviews presented earlier.

The catalyzing event was a coup d'etat in 1968 by an expressly "anti-oligarchic" and nationalistic clique within the Peruvian army, led by General Juan Velasco Alvarado. Velasco fought his "revolution in participation" on many fronts: Large coastal and highland landholders were expropriated and agricultural cooperatives established in their place; U.S. oil, mining, and banking interests were threatened and sometimes expropriated; worker self-management schemes were experimented with in many industries. SINAMOS was given charge of

fostering participation in the shantytowns and set up the new and extensive network of Neighborhood Committees.

Nowhere were changes in political alignment and political culture more evident than they were in the labor movement where the Communist party and other Marxist parties became dominant over the APRA.[24] Carmen Rosa Balbi has made an important contribution by exploring changes in the climate of worker-management relations.[25] She describes a shift from *aprista* unionism to "classism," which she defines as a rising "ideology of rights," replacing "the daily practice of the apparently unlimited power and authority of the factory owner."[26] Under the previous regime of discipline, *aprista* union leaders received special treatment from management and (according to the workers Balbi interviewed) served more as enforcers of company policy than as workers' defenders. Rank-and-file union members, unfamiliar with alternative arrangements, had considered this role a natural one. In the view of one worker,

> The workers considered this a fact of nature; they didn't even feel humiliated....Among the workers there was a tendency to just accept the thing and avoid complaints. And that seems to be the base on which the leaders relied for continuing in power; they took advantage of worker's tolerance.[27]

But like many of the changes affecting the Peruvian working class during the 1970s, the penetration of classism was incomplete: Although the APRA-affiliated labor confederation, the Confederación de Trabajadores del Perú (CTP), was eclipsed by the Marxist-affiliated Confederación General de Trabajadores del Perú (CGTP), the CTP still claimed member unions with thousands of members. Furthermore the majority of Peruvian workers remained outside of labor unions and thus outside of the influence of the "classists." Many workers in the shantytowns whom I interviewed persisted in the view that labor unionism, especially of a militant sort, was undesirable. Thus Reynaldo Rojas, the Las Flores subsecretary, was strongly anti-union, believing that, if disputes broke out between workers and management, these were best resolved discretely and in private. He preferred the system of "direct dealing" (*trato directo*) because "this way we don't go on strikes or on marches...we don't create problems or anything public."

Just as important as new forms of labor organizing in the rise of a popular counter-hegemonic challenge was the flood of outside organizers and institutions into the shantytowns, a phenomenon connected with changes in the party system and in the Catholic Church. Many of these actors were college students who went to the shantytowns to recruit members for the new leftist parties that came to life in the mid-1970s; initially the organizers came from middle-class and elite backgrounds, but as more and more lower-class students gained access to higher education, they came to displace these outsider cadres.

In the district where my fieldwork took place, local activists saw their contact with these students and organizers as crucial to their changing perceptions of

themselves and the political and social world around them. Rosario Huayta, an outspoken leader from Colinas, described the effect on her of her relationship with a young student and party organizer:

Gloria Ríos [the party organizer] was a great person, very very audacious, a person who never was afraid of anyone, very decided....Even though there was no electricity, she would be with us until 11 or 12 at night, even though she didn't live here. She went up the hills with us and with the priest and Mother Eva; we went together in a commission, in the dark, we walked as a chain, even during the rainy season because we had to go to the Neighborhood Committee assemblies—that was during the time of SINAMOS. We went to the assemblies to say that we wanted a medical post. Some people applauded us; others disagreed. Gloria said "No, we can't let ourselves be defeated." She never ordered us anywhere, she always went in front....She gave me a good education. Before I was shy and thought that what I was going to say would seem stupid to other people. She said "no, you have to say what you feel." When we went to assemblies she would say "you, Rosario, you have to speak without notes, without anything, because you're a person who knows how to handle yourself. You have to say what you feel, not what I tell you."

The role of Church activists in the construction of a counter-hegemony was not always easily separated from that of students and organizers of the partisan left. Many of the priests, nuns, and lay religious workers who took up residence in the shantytowns tried to foster a more activist form of religious participation and to challenge traditional authority relations between the Church and the poor; their effort to get the poor to challenge authority extended to secular authority as well. María Romero's interpretation of her own experience illustrates the shift in perceptions that the activist Church brought about:

[In the highlands] I used to go to mass, and I liked to show respect for the priests....For us in my pueblo the priest is the maximum authority. We used to respect them a lot. But before there was no participation. When I lived in Rímac [a working class district near the center of Lima] I used to go to mass every Sunday. There I was thinking all was well, but at bottom it wasn't true.

Her later view that meaningful religious involvement required a less passive attitude of mind was linked to the arrival of an Irish priest, Father Michael:

When Miguel came he seemed strange to me. At first I asked myself "is he a father or not? Why isn't he wearing his uniform? How strange, could I be making a mistake?" So I asked him "your clothes father, don't you have them?" He laughed and that gave me more confidence. "Don't you like my clothes?" Then he talked with me and explained that they were making a change, the Fathers had to work with the people.

But just as the impact of "classist" labor organizers was incomplete and sometimes contradictory, it would be a mistake to think of either the Church or left parties as having a uniformly radicalizing effect on those they came into contact with in the shantytowns. A more authoritarian middle-class student than Señorita Gloria could easily reinforce a kind of class subservience in people like

Rosario Huayta; and Huayta's admiration for Gloria contained elements of a sort of awe for the willingness of the latter, a child of privilege, to scale *barrio* hills in the rain. The Church's impact was particularly subtle and contradictory. Throughout the 1980s and so far in the early 1990s the Peruvian hierarchy has been deeply divided over the "option for the poor," and that conflict was played out in the shantytowns. For example, the nun who supported the Las Flores Mother's Club was joined in 1985 by a priest from a very conservative Spanish order; she complained of being kept awake at night by the medieval chants of the newcomer's followers who he encouraged to take up other-worldly contemplation.

Even Church workers who promoted a critical and egalitarian worldview sometimes found themselves playing the role of broker between government patrons and lower-class clients, inadvertently reinforcing the "assistentialist" mentality they so loathed. A nun who served as an "advisor" to the popular dining halls in Colinas recounted the following incident with a good deal of ambivalence. Leaders of the communal dining halls that she worked with were invited in 1981 to visit the presidential palace along with a large number of women from similar organizations from other parts of Lima. The nun accompanied the group. Violeta Correa, the wife of then-president Fernando Belaúnde Terry, appeared at the event. When the Colinas group saw women from other districts approach Correa with requests for aid, they pressed their "advisor" (now in effect their leader) to do the same. The result was a donation of two industrial sewing machines and several rolls of fabric which the dining hall members tried to use, quite unsuccessfully, to generate income. The nun had reluctantly found herself playing the role of Church agent brokering goods, one-shot donations, from the president's wife.[28]

POLITICAL CHANGE IN PERU AND HEGEMONY RECONSIDERED

Is hegemony at work among Lima's lower classes? Have the self-serving representations of the dominant become the "common sense" of the dominated? To begin to answer these questions it is worthwhile to recall the forms that various authors have expected hegemony to take. Gramsci had little specific to say about the content of hegemonized consciousness, but later authors have been more explicit. Most treat hegemony as taking the form of individual or collective lower class self-deprecation, a collective sense of inferiority. This self-deprecation is expected to rest on informal theories that explain and perhaps justify the plight of the oppressed: Social hierarchy and lower-class subordination are seen as in the nature of things, the product of differences that are natural and biological, or determined by divine will. When in contrast the oppressed identify social or cultural sources of hierarchy, these causes are so deeply stamped that to fight them would be little different from fighting nature or divine powers.

Hegemony and Self-Deprecation

What evidence have we seen from Peru of hegemony as self-deprecation? Indeed there is some, coming in part from shantytown actors who no longer accepted their earlier views of the inevitability or justice of the dominance of others over them. When María Romero went to masses "thinking that all was well," and automatically respected the priests as a "maximum authority," she described a passivity and unquestioning acceptance of a relation of dominance and submission. Before meeting Father Miguel, the priest in lay clothing, she appeared not to ask herself many questions about where Church authority came from and why she "respected the priests a lot."

Romero identifies making the acquaintance of Father Miguel as a break in her own way of looking at her religious life and beyond that as a recognition and rejection of the passivity in her relations with religious and secular authorities alike. "I used to go to mass every Sunday. There I was thinking all was well, but at bottom it wasn't true": Romero's words amount to a self-reflective and critical look back at what later appeared to her as blind obedience to authorities and a passive involvement in ritual. Later Romero learned that she was capable of more meaningful forms of "participation" and of subversion of authorities (like the SINAMOS operative). Rosario Huayta displays a similar self-understanding when she looks back at the former self who thought her words spoken in public would sound "stupid"; again it is Huayta who comes to understand her previous self as convinced falsely of her own ineffectiveness.

Consider, similarly, Laura Sánchez, the Las Flores Mothers' Club activist who, through community participation, comes to see her problems as "not mine alone" but as existing at a "district level or even...world level." To say that Sánchez is replacing an individual understanding of her plight with a social one does not put the matter strongly enough: In fact what she is hinting at is an overcoming of a sense of guilt and self-blame in connection with her poverty. Consider finally the workers Balbi interviewed who, before the rise of the "classists," had seen the authority of pro-boss union leaders as "a fact of nature [and] didn't even feel humiliated."

The manner in which Romero, Huayta, and Sánchez describe their transformation of consciousness suggests an important facet of hegemony. Their words leave the impression that, before the change occurred, they would have been laconic about their passivity and subservience and about the reasons why they thought and behaved the way they did. It is after Romero takes on a new identity as a trouble-making activist that she is capable of describing her former self as passive, and it is after Huayta finds her public voice that she understands the internalized mental barriers that previously kept her silent. One suspects that before Sánchez's self-stated transformation from self-blame to some sort of social understanding of her plight, she would have been unlikely to have rendered in

explicit discourse her individualistic interpretation of why she lived in a hovel and had difficulty feeding her family.

Perhaps we are misguided if we look for signs of hegemony in what Anthony Giddens calls "discursive consciousness" or in this case discursive self-consciousness.[29] If discursive self-consciousness, drawing on Giddens, forms part of the knowledge that actors are able to express at the level of discourse, as opposed to practical self-consciousness, "the tacit stocks of knowledge which actors draw upon in the constitution of social activity,"[30] the process of sloughing off hegemonized consciousness would seem in part to involve moving from practical to discursive self-understandings. Relations of authority and subservience that appear inevitable and right may by their very nature remain unquestioned and un-talked-about and the norms and rules of behavior that support them only tacitly understood.

Hegemony as Upper-Class Affinity

The considerable evidence of self-deprecation and unquestioned subservience notwithstanding, what is striking about the Peruvian material is the extent to which the worldviews of many shantytown actors contain what appears to be quite the opposite of self-deprecation. We have seen much evidence instead of a sort of mental identification with government bureaucrats, professionals, and bosses who in most objective senses are the social "superiors" of the squatters. The flip side of this upward identification is a lateral denigration, a distancing of lower-class actors from their neighbors and co-workers who they see as dirty, poor, dark-skinned, uncultured, and childlike. Because it may lead to similar kinds of outcomes as does self-deprecation such as blocking solidary class action, this mentality begs to be analyzed as a form of hegemony. In contrast to self-deprecation, it might be termed "upper-class affinity."[31]

It is difficult to listen to José Velásquez describe his neighbors as childlike and ignorant, to Luis Cancho's admiration of the "professionals" who staff government offices and his distancing of himself from the poor in his own neighborhood, or to Reynaldo Rojas's statement that labor disputes are best handled in private between individual workers and managers without sensing such class affinity. Rojas appears to share his employer's values of public decorum and individual courtesy, values that run against the grain of militant labor actions. Cancho brags about the honor and esteem he receives from the architects and engineers at government ministries. Velásquez openly admires the styles and habits of life of the prosperous, their shunning of "cantinas" and of "broken shoes," their homes at low altitudes, even though his own circumstances prohibit him from imitating them.

It is relatively easy to describe this upper-class affinity but more difficult to decide whether it constitutes a form of hegemonized consciousness. We are

accustomed to thinking of hegemony, at least in its "false consciousness" version, as entailing some loss or cost to those suffering under it. The logic here would go something like this: Class consciousness means the realizing of class interests and therefore material and psychic gain; hegemony means the mystifying of class interests and therefore material and psychic loss. But Velásquez, Cancho and Rojas would appear to suffer no losses and to gain in self-esteem and sense of honor and perhaps in material terms as well. If this is true, they can be seen as reaping individual benefits at the cost of class ones; their sense of self-interest would seem to be anything but mystified however ego-centered, and one would seem to have no need to invoke notions of hegemony to explain their behavior.

But is the question of psychic and material benefits to brokers in a patron-client system, at least in the case of contemporary Peru, so clear cut? On the material side, local leaders in the shantytowns were subject to an ideology of public service; skimming from pooled community resources or other forms of petty venality were clearly seen as illicit and were not particularly common. In fact the day-to-day activities of leaders imposed some costs such as bus fares to government offices, time away from work, and meals away from home; because they aspired to a form of leadership as status spending, they were reluctant to turn to community contributions to defray these costs. As one clientelistic leader complained, "it's not so beneficial to be a leader, in the first place you don't earn any salary....Do you think that people understand the sacrifice of the leader?" Indeed I saw little evidence suggesting that clientelists were leaders who had been "bought off" in any straightforwardly material sense.

Nor can one dismiss the clientelist mentality of upper-class affinity as simply a stratagem for obtaining psychological rewards, a sense of power and dignity, and therefore fundamentally different from hegemony. Indeed the connection between hegemony as upper-class affinity and hegemony as self-deprecation becomes clear when one realizes that the clientelists of Lima's shantytowns are constantly on the brink of seeing themselves as poor people at whom bureaucrats smirk or at best patronize, poor people whose chances of rising above the conditions of their neighbors are slim. The psychology of upper-class affinity appeared at least to this lay observer to be complex. Through long hours of interviews a contradictory psychological portrait of Independencia's clientelists emerged, one in which feelings of superiority comingled with angst and self-doubt. Virginia Verdera, the popular dining-hall secretary, was self-conscious about the gap between the lifestyle she aspired to and the one she was able to maintain. Despite his blustering, even Carlos Velásquez experienced clear-eyed moments when the harsh reality of his daily existence seemed to close in on him.

How well does the treatment of hegemony in Peru, both as self-deprecation and as upper-class affinity, avoid the difficulties laid out in the opening section of this article? Have we avoided confusing hegemony with dissimulation, authen-

tic acquiescence with resigned pragmatism? Have we respected the understandings of lower-class actors of their own needs, interests, and experiences? To suggest that a subset of Lima's poor simply mouths a "public transcript" for strategic reasons would be incompatible with the willingness of another subset to make very public its challenge to the norms of political and social domination. Those who shun protests and marches were not simply reflecting a realistic assessment that such strategies do not work, because they know they can work. To sustain the opposite moreover, one would have to deny much evidence of an entire idea system that the "hegemonized" actors hold, an interconnected set of ideas about one's own class identification, the causes of social hierarchy, and the nature of the state and its relations with the poor.

Even more troublesome, to deny that a certain hegemonized consciousness has existed among Lima's poor and continues to exist among a subset in the shantytowns would put one in the awkward position of downplaying the self-understanding of those who see themselves as having undergone a change in consciousness. The counter-hegemony associated with practices of protest and resistance emerged in a specific historical context, one in which the settings and institutions molding lower-class political worldviews were transformed. Those who became immersed in these currents of change reflected on their own particular experiences and in so doing rendered accounts of how and why they changed. There was not a hint in the discourse of María Romero, Rosario Huayta, or Laura Sánchez that their own self-identified prior subservience or self-deprecation was a pose, a stratagem aimed at appealing to the vanity of the powerful. Nor was there any hint that they had previously simply resigned themselves to what was practically possible while desiring more. Such a strategic cast of mind would have implied a distance from the outward signs of subservience, a distance that none of these people acquired until after their consciousness and self-understanding had been deeply transformed.

The recent history of popular political consciousness in Peru is of interest not only because it demonstrates hegemony at work but also because it illustrates the flowering of a counterhegemony. It is not inconsistent with the main theme of this article, the ability of the dominant to leave a deep mark on the consciousness and perceived interests of the dominated, to suggest that inklings of a more independent working-class political worldview are always visible even when dominant-class hegemony appears most solid (in this case when the oligarchic state was at its apex). Certain historical conditions—the defection of members of the hegemonic bloc (in this case particularly portions of the military and the Church) and thus the undermining from within of the oligarchic state—set the stage for the rise of a counter-hegemonic mentality and counter-hegemonic social movements. As these mentalities and movements grew, the institutions and forces that had helped them to emerge were greatly strengthened; the relationship between the popular

movement and the conditions propitious to its growth was dialectical and mutually reinforcing.[32] Peru offers an example then of one path from "intellectual subordination" of the lower classes to more autonomous forms of lower-class consciousness.

NOTES

1. These ideas are contained in Antonio Gramsci, *Selections from the Prison Notebooks*, Quintin Hoare and Geoffrey Nowell Smith, eds. and trans. (New York: International Publisher, 1971) especially in the sections on "The Role of Intellectuals," "The State and Civil Society," and "The Study of Philosophy."

2. Karl Marx and Fredrich Engels, *Feuerbach: Opposition of the Materialist and Idealist Outlooks* (London: Lawrence and Wishart, 1973), p. 51.

3. James Scott, *Weapons of the Weak* (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1985).

4. See, for example, the introductory chapter of Theda Skocpol, *States and Social Revolutions: A Comparative Analysis of France, Russia and China* (Cambridge, Eng.: Cambridge University Press, 1979). Rational choice theorists also reject the notion of hegemony although rarely directly and for somewhat different reasons. For a sampling of rational choice theorists' views of resistance and revolution, see Michael Taylor, ed., *Rationality and Revolution* (Cambridge, Eng.: Cambridge University Press, 1988).

5. As Scott notes, he has borrowed the concept of "euphemization" from Pierre Bourdieu, *Outline of a Theory of Practice*, Richard Nice, trans. (Cambridge, Eng.: Cambridge University Press, 1979).

6. Scott, *Weapons of the Weak*, p. 317.

7. Ibid., p. 313.

8. Ibid., p. 309, emphasis in the original.

9. Ibid., p. 326.

10. Ibid., p. 324.

11. Ibid., pp. 325–326.

12. All people's names, unless of public knowledge, are pseudonyms. Independencia is the real name of the district where I worked, but the names of small neighborhoods within the district are pseudonyms.

13. I carried out fieldwork in this district during an 18-month period in 1985 and 1986. The fieldwork involved participant observation in a variety of local organizations and close collaboration with the Office of Neighborhood Participation of the district mayor's office. I also interviewed about two dozen activists, community leaders, and other residents; the interviews were open ended and taped. At the end of the fieldwork period, I ran a sample survey of the district's voting population. For fuller details, see Susan C. Stokes, "Politics and Latin America's Urban Poor: Notes from a Lima Shantytown," *Latin American Research Review* 26, no. 2 (1991): 75–101.

14. Ibid.

15. Ibid.

16. This was partly because of lower prices for food bought in bulk and some economies of scale in preparing meals but mainly because these organizations were eligible for church-administered donations of foodstuffs (the ultimate source of which was U.S. PL480 agricultural surpluses).

17. The military regime and its effects will be described more fully later in this article. For a description of the regime's activities in the shantytowns, see Alfred Stepan, *The State and Society: Peru in Comparative Perspective* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1978), chapter 5.

18. The analysis in this section draws on a broad range of sources. Of particular importance are Julio Cotler, *Clases, Estado, y Nación en el Perú* (Lima: Instituto de Estudios Peruanos, 1978); Abraham Lowenthal, ed., *The Peruvian Experiment: Continuity and Change under Military Rule* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1975); Abraham Lowenthal and Cynthia McClintock, eds., *The Peruvian Experiment Reconsidered* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1983); and Rosemary Thorp and Geoffrey Bertram, *Peru, 1890–1977: Growth and Policy in an Open Economy* (London: Macmillan, 1978).

19. Steve Stein captures this elitism in his *Populism in Peru: The Emergence of the Masses and the Politics of Social Control* (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1980). Cotler, in his *Clases, Estado y Nación*, specifically describes Haya de la Torre's technocratic penchants. The social origins of APRA's leaders from the north are described in Peter Klarén, *Modernization, Dislocation, and Aprismo: Origins of the Peruvian Aprista Party, 1870–1932*, (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1973).

20. Interview with Arturo Sabroso, cited in Stein, *Populism in Peru*, p. 155. The situation is parallel to those described by Barrington Moore in *Injustice: The Social Bases of Obedience and Revolt* (New York: Macmillan, 1978) when members of the Indian lower castes and concentration camp prisoners in World War II who question their oppression are disciplined by their peers.

21. Stein, *Populism in Peru*, p. 105.

22. See David Collier, *Squatters and Oligarchs: Authoritarian Rule and Policy Change in Peru* (Baltimore, Md.: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1976); Henry Dietz, "Bureaucratic Demand-Making and Clientelistic Participation in Peru," in *Authoritarianism and Corporatism in Latin America*, James M. Malloy, ed. (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1977); Henry Dietz, *Poverty and Problem-Solving under Military Rule: The Urban Poor in Lima, Peru* (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1980); and Carlos Iván Degregori, Cecilia Blondet, and Nicolas Lynch, *Conquistadores de un Nuevo Mundo: De Invasores a Ciudadanos en San Martin de Porres (Lima: Instituto de Estudios Peruanos, 1986).*

23. Manuel Antonio Carreño, *Manual de buenas maneras*, 1966, cited in Stein, *Populism in Peru.*

24. The left-associated labor federation's, the CGTP's, eclipsing of the aprista federation, the CTP, was largely the result of the military government's throwing its support behind the CTGP in an effort to undermine the CTP and the APRA. The regime failed to anticipate the degree to which the CGTP would become a powerful actor quite independent of the state and the military. See Evelyn Huber Stevens, "The Peruvian Military Government, Labor Mobilization, and the Political Strength of the Left," *Latin American Research Review*, 18, no. 2 (1983).

25. Carmen Rosa Balbi, *Identidat clasista en el sindicalismo: Su impacto en las fábricas* (Lima: DESCO, 1989).

26. Ibid., p. 3.

27. Ibid., p. 35.

28. Elsewhere I have reported the results of my sample survey of district voters that reinforce this analysis of the influences on shantytown consciousness in the 1980s. Both schooling and labor union exposure tended to produce a more radicalized outlook among residents: Those with more years of formal study and with exposure to labor unions were more likely to mistrust the central government as an ally for local organizations, to support labor unions, and to favor confrontational over legalistic strategies. The survey also provides evidence that some kinds of exposure to local organizations—both church- and party-related—had a similarly radicalizing effect on shantytown residents' political consciousness. Specifically men who took part in organizations became more radicalized whereas there was no significant effect on women participants. Although my data do not permit me to test this hypothesis directly, I believe this finding indicates differences in the kinds of organizations men and women became involved with: Men tended to take part in secular political groups; women, in religiously affiliated ones (mainly Catholic, sometimes Protestant). As the discussion suggests, the impact of religious organizations on shantytown residents' consciousness was mixed. See Stokes, "Politics and Latin America's Urban Poor."

29. Anthony Giddens, *Central Problems in Social Theory: Action, Structure and Contradiction in Social Analysis* (London: Macmillan, 1979).

30. Ibid., p. 5.

31. Following the parallel concept of "Anglo-affinity"; see Charles R. Hale, "Contradictory Consciousness: Miskito Indians and the Nicaraguan State in Conflict and Reconciliation 1880–1987," doctoral diss., Stanford University, Palo Alto, Calif., 1989.

32. Thus when the Velasco regime began favoring the Communist Party-associated CGTP, the Communist and other Marxist parties gained space for organizing workers. These parties were in turn greatly strengthened by the influx of new militants and sympathizers. The strengthened parties went on to organize much more energetically than they had before in the shantytowns. With the return to parliamentary democracy in 1980, these parties became real forces in electoral politics, benefiting from the support of those taking part in the urban popular movement the parties had helped to shape and strengthen.

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