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Constituency Influence and Representation[1]

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In their classic study "Constituency Influence in Congress", Miller and Stokes (1966) equated representation with responsiveness to constituent opinion. But when constituents are uncertain about the effects of policies and when they may come to favor a policy which they opposed before its implementation, politicians may represent constitutent's interests even though they are unresponsive to their *ex ante* preferences. Several Latin American governments that switched to unpopular policies early in their terms did so because they thought citizens were ill-informed and their preferences would change. Even though we should consider such policy switches as carried out by governments that are attempting to represent, we should not return to a Burkean ideal whereby legislators do what they deem best regardless of the will of their constituents.

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> It is generally recognized that constituency control is opposite to the conception of representation associated with Edmund Burke. Burke wanted the representative to serve the constituency's *interest*, but not its *will*, and the extent to which the representative should be compelled by electoral sanctions to follow the 'mandate' of his constituents has been at the heart of the ensuing controversy as it has continued for a century and a half—Warren E. Miller and Donald E. Stokes, *Constituency Influence in Congress*

In the ensuing 35 years since Warren Miller and Donald Stokes wrote these words, the constituency-control conception, not Burke's, has dominated empirical studies of representation. To the extent that constituencies influence or even 'control' the behavior of their legislators, the legislators *represent* their constituents. Miller and Stokes's elegant study identified two ways that such influence might occur: constituents could elect a representative with convictions like their own, so that "in following his own convictions he does the constituents' will", or the representative could vote according to his perception of constituents' opinion in order to be reelected (Miller and Stokes, 1966, p. 360).

Students of congressional representation in subsequent decades developed new methods to track the people's influence over their legislators. Their results were broadly similar. Constituents, and later 'public opinion', were found to have a powerful influence over the behavior of members of Congress, the President, the Senate, even the Supreme Court (see Stimson *et al*., 1995; Page and Shapiro, 1992; Mishler and Sheehan, 1993; Bartels, 1991; Jackson and King, 1989; for a somewhat divergent conceptualization and results see Achen, 1978). And the conceptual link between citizen influence and representation endured: politicians who enacted the people's will *represented* them. Stimson and his associates, for example, found that changes in public opinion induced changes in the behavior of members of Congress in the next period, and in the same direction. They called this pattern of influence 'dynamic *representation*'.

In the context in which Miller and Stokes wrote, the equation of constituency control with representation seemed perfectly serviceable. The Congressman whose roll-call behavior reflected constituent opinions about appropriate levels of welfare spending, or civil rights, or even intervention in foreign affairs, was enacting the constituents' will, and there was little reason to think he wasn't also in some sense advancing their 'interest'. Miller and Stokes and those who followed them in the study of congressional representation saw no reason to draw a distinction between a Representative's *responsiveness* to the people's will and his *representation* of their interests.

As the study of constituency, or more broadly citizen, influence over governments moves to democracies where the effects of government action are less certain, the people's will less predictable, and the constraints on government action more intrusive, it may be useful to revive a distinction between responsiveness to citizen opinion and representation of their interests. In what follows I first offer evidence from several Latin American democracies of egregious failures of governments to respond to citizens' will, as expressed in policy mandates delivered in elections that just took place. Next I explain these break-downs in responsiveness, showing that a plausible case can be made that politicians violated responsiveness because they thought doing so was in the best interest of their constituents and hence the surest route to reelection. Contrary to the implicit assumption of earlier studies, that politicians are unrepresentative to the extent that their actions respond to the will of actors other than their constituents, in the Latin American cases politicians sometimes thought they had to respond to market actors and not to citizens if they were to be judged successful at the end of their term. In the concluding section I contrast the distinction between the people's will and their interest as conceived by Burke, with the distinction proposed here. I contend that the departure from the representation-as-responsiveness conception employed in the positive U.S. literature on representation need not imply a return to Burke's conception, which rested on his disdain for the people's ability to make intelligent choices. People's will may at times be at odds with their interests for good and limited reasons: they may lack important information and the effects of policy may be uncertain. And we expect their will to again become a reasonable reflection of their interest when information is provided and uncertainty resolved.

The Violation of Responsiveness: Three Latin American Cases[2]

In 12 of the 44 presidential election campaigns that took place in Latin America between 1982 and 1995, the winning candidate pronounced himself[3] in favor of some combination of job creation, growth, higher real wages, industrial policy, a gradualist approach to inflation stabilization, and limited repayment of the foreign debt, only to impose austerity and a withdrawal of the state from the economy immediately upon coming to office (see Table 1). All of these immediate, drastic policy switches were in the same direction: from 'welfare-oriented' campaigns to 'efficiency-oriented' policies (the latter term is borrowed from Elster, 1995).

The most stunning policy switches were those in which the candidate's history, partisan affiliation, campaign-crafted identity, and policy pronouncements all signalled a commitment

Table 1. Presidential elections and policy switches in Latin America's Democracies, 1982–95

Country	Year	Country	Year
Argentina	1983	Ecuador	1984
	1989 s		1988 s
	1995		1992 s
Bolivia	1985	El Salvador	1984
	1989 s		1989
	1993		1994
Brazil	1989	Guatemala	1985 v
	1994		1990 v
Chile	1989		1995
	1993	Honduras	1985
Colombia	1982 s		1989
	1986		1993
	1990	Nicaragua	1984
	1994		1990
Costa Rica	1982v	Peru	1985
	1986		1990 s
	1990 s		1995
	1994 s	Uruguay	1984
Dominican Rep.	1982 s		1989
	1986		1994
	1990 s	Venezuela	1983
	1994 v		1988 s
			1993 s

s Denotes an election followed by a policy switch.
v Denotes an election after a vague campaign, one in which candidates make no policy proposals.

to welfare-oriented policies, and those policies were entirely discarded in favor of a sharp neoliberal turn early in the new government. I first describe three such switches, those of Carlos Menem of Argentina (1989–95) and Alberto Fujimori of Peru (1990–95) in their first terms, and of Carlos Andrés Pérez in Venezuela (1989–93), before turning to an explanation of the general phenomenon of post-election switches.[4]

Argentina

During the early months of 1989, the outgoing Unión Cívica Radical (UCR) government of Raúl Alfonsín struggled against high (though not yet hyper) inflation, recession, and heavy international debt obligations. The ruling party's presidential candidate, Eduardo Angeloz, distanced himself from some specific government policies and called for the resignation of the finance minister after the failure of a late 1988 emergency economic plan. Still Angeloz called for 'deepening' the economic reforms of the Alfonsín government: trade liberalization, good standing with international financial institutions, and privatization of state-owned enterprises.

Alvaro Alsogaray, the candidate of the conservative Unión del Centro Democrático (UCD) called for liberalization of trade, the exchange rate, and wages, for speedy privatizations, and for honoring standing agreements with international creditors.

Carlos Menem was the presidential candidate of the Peronist party (Partido Justicialista, PJ). Menem's was a colorful campaign, which emphasized his fondness for soccer, race cars, and fashion models. His economic message was nationalist and expansionist. He called for stabilizing the economy without imposing hardships on workers or the middle class. A book he and his running mate coauthored during the campaign called for a '*revolución productiva*' or productive revolution (Menem and Duhalde, 1988). With mildly expansionary policies to exploit unused industrial capacity Argentina would overcome depressed real wages, high unemployment, and price instability. At the very moment when the incumbent Alfonsín government was imposing austerity measures, '*paquetazos*', Menem on the campaign trail invented the term '*salariazo*', a big upward shock to wages. Consistent with the Peronist tradition, Menem championed a development model that included state ownership of heavy industry, utilities, and oil, and expressed distrust of Argentina's export bourgeoisie, epitomized by the conglomerate Bunge y Born. Early in the campaign Menem called for a moratorium on payments of Argentina's foreign debt, although he later moderated his position with a call for a five-year cessation of repayment and renegotiation on terms favorable to Argentina. Still, he insisted he would not pay Argentina's debt "by making the people go hungry" (cited in Schuler, 1994). Finally, Menem warned Britain that blood might again flow in the Malvinas or Falkland Islands.

In the election on 14 May, Menem won 47% of the vote, Angeloz 37%, and Alsogaray 6%.

The Alfonsín government was scheduled to stay in office another seven months, until December. Alfonsín announced a new set of economic measures 4 days after the election, but inflation continued to surge, reaching nearly 100% before month's end. Rioting and looting on 23 May left fourteen dead. The crisis produced an agreement between the government and Menem to move the transition forward to July.

When Menem announced his cabinet appointments in July they contained surprises. He named Miguel Roig, a former vice-president of Bunge y Born and "an outstanding symbol of *vendepatria* [sellout] capitalism to all Peronists", as his finance minister (Smith, 1991, p. 52). When Roig died of a heart attack 11 days after taking office, Menem turned the selection of a replacement over to Bunge y Born's president, who chose Nestor Rapanelli, another vice-president of the firm. Menem's labor minister was Jorge Triaca, a conservative labor figure. Triaca's appointment and the government's emerging economic policies precipitated a split in the Peronist labor confederation, the Confederación General de Trabajadores (CGT), and the founding of an antigovernment wing of the CGT under Saúl Ubaldini. Other Menem cabinet appointments were equally surprising, as were his efforts, beginning during his first months in office, to normalize relations with Britain.

Menem's economic policies bore a close resemblance to those advocated by his two opponents in the campaign. By August of 1989, only three months after the election, the language of '*salariazo*' was long forgotten. Menem introduced his austerity program exhorting Argentines to accept "a tough, costly, and severe adjustment" requiring "major surgery, no anesthesia" (cited in Smith, 1991, p. 53). The Bunge y Born plan (as it was known) included a sharp fiscal adjustment and a 170% devaluation of the *austral*. Public service rates rose between 200% and 640%, gasoline 550%. No salary increases were announced to soften the blow, and workers were offered only a bonus, the equivalent of $12.

Privatization was a top priority. Roberto Dromi, the minister of public works, drafted legislation that declared all state-owned companies "subject to privatization". Congress approved the 'Dromi law' in September. Privatized industries included telecommunications, the national airline, television and radio stations, petrochemicals, and steel. In addition to privatization, the government moved to liberalize foreign trade, phasing out export taxes and import tariffs (see Smith, 1991). Having called in the campaign for a moratorium and then five-year cessation of payments on the foreign debt, Menem named Alvaro Alsogaray, the presidential candidate from the right-wing Uniún del Centro Democrático as his chief debt negotiator in Washington.

Peru

Peru's 1990 presidential campaign took place against a backdrop of dire economic crisis. In 1989 GNP had contracted by 10.4%, inflation rose to 2775%, and the external debt stood at over US$19 billion (almost $1000 per capita). This was only the worst year in a prolonged period of economic decline. The economic crisis and poor governmental performance discredited the incumbent APRA party's candidate.

Neither Vargas Llosa, the leading candidate at the outset of the campaign, nor Alberto Fujimori, who emerged as Vargas Llosa's main rival, were professional politicians. But Vargas Llosa had a long involvement in national and international politics, and his candidacy was supported by parties of the Right. In contrast, Fujimori had no ties to traditional political parties. Born to Japanese parents, Fujimori was a mathematician and in the 1980s rector of the National Agrarian University. In 1990 he stitched together *Cambio*'90 (Change'90), more a campaign vehicle than a party, from socially progressive Protestant evangelicals and an association of informal-sector workers. Fujimori rose from obscurity during the last month before the general the election in April. On 8 March, when his name first appeared in public opinion polls (until then he had been an 'Other'), he commanded 4% support. His standing rose to 15% on 25 March, and to 21% on 1 April (Apoyo, *Informe de Opinion*, March and April, 1990). In the general election on 8 April Fujimori took 25% of the vote, Vargas Llosa 28%.

Economic policy dominated the campaign. Vargas Llosa proposed to resolve the crisis through what would amount to a neoliberal revolution. He viewed Peru's overgrown state as the main barrier to economic growth and 'modernity'. The state's role should be restricted to providing essential health, education, and communications services. He proposed a 'radical attack' on inflation with a drastic reduction of the fiscal deficit. The first weapon of attack was to be a one-time sharp increase of prices of consumer goods and state services, a fiscal adjustment or 'shock'.

Fiscal adjustment would be accompanied by structural reforms including sharp reductions in government personnel, privatization, and an end to 'mercantilist' trade protection. The promise was that these measures, painful in the short term, would increase general welfare in the future. As a Vargas Llosa campaign slogan put it, "It will cost us … but together we will make the Great Change" ("*Nos costará … pero juntos haremos el Gran Cambio*").

Fujimori's campaign rhetoric was of a very different flavor. His strategy was to appeal to the lower- and lower-middle classes by advocating stabilization with a minimum of recession and job loss. Most salient of his economic themes in the campaign was his opposition to a one-time draconian fiscal adjustment, the 'shock'. The view of the 'neo-Keynesian' economic advisors whom Fujimori recruited into his campaign was that an immediate, large increase in the price of government services, removal of subsidies on basic goods, and a devaluation, would be ineffective in controlling inflation and would further concentrate income. The concentration of income would lower private investment and retard growth (see Figueroa, 1993). Fujimori also called for an industrial policy, support for small business, and reinsertion of Peru into international financial institutions (Cambio'90, 1990).

Fears of the fiscal adjustment and neoliberal reforms contributed to Fujimori's 57–35% victory (8% invalid) over Vargas Llosa in the run-off election in June.[5]

Ten days after Fujimori's inauguration, on 7 August, tanks rolled onto the streets of Lima in preparation for the announcement the next day of a package of dramatic price adjustments: the 'shock'. The price of gasoline rose by 3140%; the price of kerosene, used as cooking fuel by poor consumers, by 6964%. Subsidies for many basic foodstuffs were removed and their prices soared: bread by 1567%, cooking oil by 639%, sugar by 552%, and rice by 533%. Medicine prices rose on average by 1385%.

Fujimori's longer-term economic reforms also read remarkably like those Vargas Llosa had proposed: exchange rate unification and liberalization, reduction and simplification of tariffs on imports, elimination of tariffs on exports, capital market liberalization. These measures would later be followed by fiscal reform, reduction of employment in government ministries and state-owned enterprises, privatization of state-owned enterprises and financial institutions, elimination of job security laws, elimination of wage indexation, liberalization of labor relations, and privatization of social security.

Venezuela

To secure the Acción Democrática (AD) presidential candidacy in 1988, Carlos Andrés Pérez had to defeat a rival, Octavio Lepage, who had the support of incumbent President Jaime Lusinchi. Pérez relied on support from AD labor leaders in his struggle against Lepage. Once Pérez had secured the AD candidacy, his campaign went through two distinct phases. In the first phase, from December 1987 to June 1988, Pérez pronounced himself in favor of policies that reflected his debt to labor and recalled his presidency in the mid-1970s, at the height of Venezuela's oil boom. He promised a substantial across-the-board wage increase and a major 'war' against poverty. His opponent, COPEI's Eduardo Fernández, advocated a free-floating exchange rate, a reduced role for the state in the economy, privatization of heavy industry, ports, and services, and inflation stabilization.

Midway through the campaign, with a strong lead in the polls, Pérez appeared to ease toward the center on economic policy, without reversing any previous positions and without moving to the right of his opponent. He called for a multi-tiered exchange rate within a system of continued exchange controls, trade liberalization while maintaining protection for local industry, joint action by Latin American debtors, and 'moderate' and 'selective' privatizations of state activities.

On 4 December, Pérez became the first Venezuelan to win the presidency twice, defeating Fernández 53%–40%.

As president-elect, Pérez announced '*el Gran Virage*' or the Great Turnaround, the liberalization of the Venezuelan economy. It included a fiscal adjustment, aimed at reducing the public-sector deficit from 9.9% to 4% of GDP. Prices of goods and services, frozen by Lusinchi, were raised, and price controls on all but 18 goods were eliminated. The increases were steep: 100% for gasoline, 133% for natural gas, 30% for public transportation. Pérez also quickly reassured the business community, insisting that there would be no substantial across-the-board wage increase. The government adopted a single floating exchange rate, liberalized interest rates, reduced import tariffs to below 40% on average, and announced privatization measures and other structural reforms (see Hausmann, 1995; Naím, 1993).

Consequences of Violations of Responsiveness

Did voters punish politicians who changed course?

In one of the three cases discussed here, the answer is yes. The liberalization of prices, the first step in Pérez's Great Turnaround, produced an explosion: demonstrations and riots in Caracas that left at least 300 people dead and 1000 injured. The political debacle continued, fed by the excessive costs of the economic program. The first in a series of 'big bang' efforts to correct past policy deficiencies all at once (see Hausmann, 1995; Martinelli and Tomassi, 1998), the program unintentionally overshot its targets, causing considerably more hardship than necessary. Non-oil output, which grew by 5.6% in 1988, was predicted to grow by a more modest 2.0% in 1989 under the austerity program. In fact the non-oil economy contracted by 9.8% in 1989. Even when economic conditions improved after 1990, the public image of the government failed to recover. Pérez was twice challenged in coup attempts in 1992. The challenges to the constitutional order in Latin America's second oldest democracy were astounding. With abysmal approval ratings, Pérez was impeached on corruption charges in 1993. And the share of the vote going to the AD candidate in 1993 was 24%, down from 53% in 1988.

The story of Fujimori's and Menem's first terms contrasts starkly with the Pérez debacle. Both presidents were rewarded for the risk they took in violating their mandate. Fujimori struggled in public opinion during his first year and a half in office. He had highly volatile and generally declining approval ratings, as Peruvians tried to make sense of this unknown man who won the election by surprise and then implemented his opponent's program. But two factors made his popularity soar, beginning in 1992. Fujimori led a palace coup in April, in which he closed Congress and suppressed the constitution; the public, exhausted by economic crisis and insurgency, responded enthusiastically to the apparent return to order. The government's success in reducing inflation also contributed to Fujimori's popularity, even though polls taken at the beginning of the term showed Peruvians to be skeptical of the effectiveness of such programs in reducing inflation (S. Stokes, 1996).[6] This skepticism was especially widespread among the urban lower and lower-middle classes, who provided Fujimori most of his votes in 1990. Growth also resumed after mid-1992. In the last year of Fujimori's predecessor's term, the economy was contracting at an annual rate of nearly 10%; in the last year of Fujimori's first term, output was expanding at nearly 11%. With economic stability restored and political authority reestablished, Fujimori engineered a change in presidential term limits after the coup that allowed him to run again in 1995; he ran and won handily.

The Menem story is similar. Menem also floundered initially. Until 1991 his austerity program failed to control inflation. But with the success, beginning in early 1991, of finance minister Domingo Cavallo's 'Convertibilty Plan', which finally rid the Argentine economy of the bouts of hyperinflation that had characterized the end of the Alfonsín years and the beginning of Menem's term. When Menem assumed office output was falling at an annual rate of 3.4%; by the end of his term it was growing at 6.7%. Price stability and growth placed Menem in a positioned to revise the constitution (this time without a coup), changing term limits so that he could run again in 1995. He did so, and won handily.[7]

In short, at least two of our unresponsive politicians switched to policies that seemed to induce a *preference*-switch among voters, who richly rewarded both politicians with reelection.

Analysis of data contained in a cross-national dataset I have assembled suggests that although politicians who switched policies were at risk of a loss of support in later elections, strong economic performance could mitigate the damage. I coded all competitive presidential elections that took place in Latin America between 1982 and 1995 according to whether the winner's economic policy pronouncements in the campaign predicted well or badly the actual policies undertaken in the first year of his or her term (the coding was dichotomous: either governments switched or they were consistent). The database also included economic measures (inflation, changes in GDP, international currency reserves, budget deficits; all from *International Financial Statistics*, IMF), election results, the majority status of governments, term limits, the economic policy orientation of the prior government, and other political and institutional measures.

Holding economic outcomes equal, end-of-term voteshares were lower for policy switchers than for non-switchers. Consider the regression model of incumbent party voteshare in Table 2. The constant, –12.7, is the *y*-intercept for non-switchers. It indicates that under the condition of no change in GDP, the voteshare of consistent politicians at the end of their term was 12.7 points lower than their share in the election that brought them to office.[8] The constant for the sub-sample of switchers is the sum of the constant and the coefficient on the SWITCH dummy: (–12.7) + (–8.6) = – 21.3. Hence, when the difference between beginning and end-of-term GDP growth rates is 0, incumbents who switched policies lose almost twice as many votes as non-switchers. The penalty for incumbency is high; for switching it is much higher.

Yet when economic performance was good after a policy switch, voters rewarded policy switchers more richly than non-switchers. Consider again the OLS regression in Table 2, which includes an interaction term (GDP*SWITCH), the difference in before- and end-of-term GDP growth (DIFGDP) multiplied by the SWITCH dummy. Following Gujarati (1995, 512 ff.), the effect of GDP change in the base category, non-switchers, is given by the coefficient on DIFGDP. We see that the coefficient, 1.04, is significant at the 93% level. The effect of GDP change among switchers is given by the sum of the coefficient on DIFGDP and the interaction term: 1.04 + 2.49 = 3.53. Hence, whereas a 1% increase in GDP over the course of the term among non-switchers was associated with about a 1% increase in vote share, among switchers the same change in GDP was associated with a 3.5% increase in vote share. The effect of GDP change on electoral support was magnified three and a half times among politicians who switched policies early in the term.

Explaining Policy Switches

The three new presidents described here abandoned policies that had just contributed to getting them elected, rejecting them in favor of policies they had sometimes ridiculed in the campaign. Their actions were highly visible and politically risky. What explains these dramatic moments of unresponsiveness?

In all three cases it is clear that, in switching, governments were responding to market actors,

Table 2. OLS regression, dependent variable INCUMBENT PARTY VOTESHARE[a], 23 observations

Variable	Coefficient	SE	*t*-ratio	Prob$\|t\| \geq x$	Mean	Std.
Constant	–12.69	2.43	–5.23	0.000		
SWITCH[b]	–8.58	3.73	–2.30	0.033	0.39	0.49
DIFGDP[c]	1.04	0.54	1.94	0.068	3.27	4.37
GDP* SWITCH	2.49	0.69	3.590	0.002	1.49	3.88

$R^2 = 0.786$, Adjusted $R^2 = 0.752$. $F(3,19) = 23.26$, Prob value 0.000.

[a]Percent of the vote election at $t = 2$, at the end of the incumbent's term, minus percent of the vote commanded by that party at $t = 1$, the beginning of the term.

[b]Dummy variable for politicians who switched. Source: LACAP.

[c]Difference between the average GDP growth rate in the two years leading up to term and average growth rate during the last two years of the term. Source: *International Financial Statistics*, IMF.

including international financial institutions, foreign creditors, domestic investors, and currency speculators. In some instances, the pressures came from the uncoordinated, decentralized action of markets. In Peru, Fujimori's election sparked a run on the currency. The *inti* declined 43% in relation to the dollar in the month after the first round of elections, an additional 63% and 67% in June and July. In other instances, the pressure came from powerful individuals who predicted bleak consequences should the politician follow through on the economic program promised in the campaign. When Pérez tried to recruit a young economist to serve as his minister of industrial development, the economist advised the president-elect that Venezuela was about to experience the worst bout of inflation in its history, only to be avoided through a liberalization of prices (interview with Moisés Naím, 1993).[9]

Explicit pressure was also exerted on Fujimori. Weeks after winning the run-off election in June, Fujimori and two advisors traveled to New York (ironically, while the furor still raged over George Bush's then-recent reneging on his 'no new taxes' campaign pledge). Fujimori and one of his advisors, the economist Adolfo Figueroa, attended a meeting at the United Nations with Michel Camdessus, the managing director of the IMF, Barber Conable, the president of the World Bank, and Enrique Iglesias, the president of the Interamerican Development Bank (IDB). At the meeting, as reported to me by Figueroa, the following alternatives were communicated to Fujimori. If the new president tried to avoid an immediate, painful adjustment, his administration would run the course of Alan García's. If he did not adjust, he ought not to turn to the international financial institutions for help. If he did adjust and complemented 'realistic' short-term stabilization measures with structural reforms, the IFIs would be there to help him.

Yet 'market strikes' and overt pressures notwithstanding, what my research makes clear is that most politicians who switched policies already knew during the campaign that the programs they ran on would probably never be implemented. In a 1993 interview with a Buenos Aires journalist, Carlos Menem admitted that he had dissimulated in the campaign, hiding his intentions to privatize industry and pursue other reforms at odds with the Peronist tradition. Campaign strategists whom I interviewed revealed that Menem's decision to pursue liberalization had been taken immediately after the Peronist primary elections—a full year before he took power! Evidence from Venezuela suggests that Pérez planned policies of the Great Turnaround well before his election. Even Fujimori, whose attention was rivetted on the campaign and who thought little about what would happen after the election, was not at all certain that he would remain faithful to his 'anti-shock' slogan. Admonished by an aide to reconsider his no-fiscal-shock promise, "think more like a statesman, less like a politician", Fujimori replied "If I don't act like a politician now, I'll never get to be a statesman" (interview with Fernando Villarán, 1993).

Given the timing of these decisions to pursue efficiency policies, two questions must be answered: first, why did politicians opt for liberalization, and second, why did they hide this decision from voters?

The answer to the second question is that politicians thought they would be rejected by voters if they revealed their efficiency-oriented intentions in the campaign. The answer to the first is that they thought that the risk of economic disaster under the policies they announced in the campaign—disaster induced by the reaction of markets—was great enough to outweigh the risk of switching to policies which a majority of voters had just rejected. And they thought that voters might be coaxed into approving *ex post* policies which they had feared *ex ante*.

Politicians and campaign strategists whom I interviewed in several countries outlined this strategic thinking. One of them Roberto Dromi, the Menem advisor in 1989 who later became minister of public works. What follows is part of my 1994 interview with Dromi:

> S. Stokes: If Menem knew in the campaign that he would pursue austerity and liberalization, why did he talk in the campaign about a moratorium on the debt and about the '*salariazo*'?
>
> Dromi: If we hadn't talked about a *salariazo* we would have frightened public-sector workers, who are 10% of the working population of Argentina.
>
> S: But why didn't you announce that you would reduce the deficit, and win the votes of the 90% of Argentine workers who weren't public-sector workers and who wanted inflation to come down?

(At this point in the interview, which took place in Dromi's law office, he pulled from the shelf *Nuevo Estado, Nuevo Derecho* (Dromi, 1994), a book he had written, and opened to the epigraph, a quote from Machiavelli's *The Prince*, which he then read aloud:

> Nothing does so much honor to a new man who emerges as much as his devising of new laws and new institutions. When these things have good foundations and greatness, they make him respected and admired …. [T]here is nothing more difficult to try, nor more doubtful of success, nor more dangerous to deal with, than to take it upon oneself to introduce new institutions, because the introducer makes enemies out of all those who benefit from the old institutions and is feebly defended by all those who might benefit from the new ones. This feebleness arises, in part from the fear of the opposition, who have the laws on their side, in part from the skepticism of men, who do not truly believe in novelties until they see them arising out of firm experience.[10]
>
> D: We were not sure we would win the election. First we thought Cafiero would win the primaries, then we thought Angeloz would win the general election. We didn't want to risk losing the votes of left Peronists, unions, industrialists in protected industries, and public employees by talking about liberalization and privatization.
>
> S: Why did you make an alliance with Alsogaray after the election?
>
> D: We wanted to send a clear signal, so we named Julia Alsogaray as *inventora* of Entel and Frigerio as head of YPF.[11]
>
> S. A signal to whom?
>
> D. To God and the devil, to everyone. To Morgan Guaranty, the U.S. government, the World Bank.

To summarize, politicians like Pérez, Fujimori, and Menem adopted welfare-oriented campaign platforms as a strategy to win the up-coming election, but foresaw abandoning these policies, or at least severely modifying them, should they win. They recognized that reneging on campaign pronouncements might be costly. But they believed that their preferred policies would induce salient and tangible results, such as price stability where high inflation had been endemic and that voters would become convinced of the appropriateness of these policies. And perhaps, in volatile political environments, they placed a high value on winning the first election and discounted the future heavily.[12] Some, like Fujimori ("if I don't think like a politician now I'll never get to be a statesman"), knew that losing the present election meant exiting the political arena for good. In close races, therefore, they were willing to risk their post-election future and promise whatever they believed voters wanted to hear.

Caught between the market and voters, voters who may not have appreciated fully the constraints imposed by the market, some presidential candidates in Latin America took the risky move of promising one thing in campaign and immediately doing another in power.

Models by Harrington (1993a,b) suggest the strategic orientation of policy switchers. The models emphasize voter uncertainty regarding the effect of policies on outcomes. Assume two politicians who compete for election and then reelection in a two-period world. They have beliefs about which policies will maximize voters' welfare, beliefs which are private information. Voters also have such beliefs, but are unsure of their correctness. In the second election voters will judge the incumbents' performance according to the net change in their own welfare during the first period. If in the first election the politician promised the policies which a majority of voters initially thought optimal, voters will judge politicians by a retrospective standard which is more lax; if the politician dissimulated his intentions before the first election and switched policies in the first term, voters' retrospective standard will be more demanding. Hence, all things equal, the politician who comes to office announcing the policies he thinks best and then pursues these policies will be reelected more easily than one who comes to office dissimulating his beliefs and then switches. Harrington shows that politicians will dissimulate and switch if they believe their preferred policies will perform sufficiently well to induce unsupportive voters to switch to preferring them.

Harrington's model helps make sense of my findings that voters hold policy switchers to a higher standard than those who enact the policies they ran on, as well as the finding that voters' judgements of incumbents are more sensitive to outcomes when politicians switched course early in their term. We saw that voters did hold policy switchers to a higher standard: with no economic growth, incumbency was worth –12.7% for consistent politicians but –21.3% for governments that had changed course. In turn voters' greater sensitivity to economic outcomes when politicians switched is suggestive of exactly the sort of uncertainty that Harrington emphasizes. These were governments elected by voters for whom the welfare-oriented, pro-growth message was appealing, and whose priors were that austerity and neoliberal reforms would be ineffective or harmful. Such governments had to work harder to persuade voters that neoliberalism in fact had been the right course, where 'working harder' meant producing better economic outcomes. Recall that an increase in GDP produced a three-and-one-half times greater increase in the incumbent party's voteshare when the incumbent switched policies than when his government had been consistent; by the same token, a decline in GDP produced a three-and-one-half times greater decline in the voteshare of incumbent policy switchers than of consistent governments.

Had voters been certain of the effects of policies, they might have attributed unexpectedly good performance under efficiency policies to, say, international conditions rather than to the government's policies. In this case economic performance would have had the same effect on voters' assessment of incumbents, whether their policies had been consistent or inconsistent with their initial mandates. But this was not the case. Voters' greater sensitivity to economic outcomes under inconsistent governments is suggestive of considerable uncertainty, uncertainty which—as we saw—politicians sensed and worked into their strategems.

To summarize, at least some Latin American politicians were unresponsive to the people's will because they thought voters' beliefs were wrong and that voters would do better (and their own political careers would be enhanced) if the politicians reversed themselves and pursued policies that were *ex ante* unpopular. Or to put it negatively, these politicians thought that if they did what they had promised in the campaign all hell would break loose in the economy, saw all hell beginning to break loose as speculators bet against the currency and international actors threatened financial isolation, and believed there was a good chance their political careers would end after this term—perhaps even sooner—if they did not act to reassure markets. To the extent that politicians anticipated a 'Harrington effect' they were right: voters held governments that switched to a higher retrospective standard than governments that were consistent. Yet our evidence that on average switchers were not punished severely at the polls the next time around suggests that economic performance under *ex ante* unpopular policies was often sufficiently good to change voters' policy preferences.

Citizen Influence, Responsiveness, and Representation

If this is the right way to think about the experiences of Latin American democracies in the midst of pro-market reforms, then the need for a richer conceptualization of representation than mere 'citizen influence' becomes clear. If citizen opinion changes, then which opinions will the politician who aspires to represent them enact? If citizen opinion is better informed after the government has acted than before, will the representative allow her actions to be guided by *ex ante* opinion?

Latin America's recent experience with democracy counsels us to be cautious in equating citizen influence, responsiveness, and representation. These equations, which appeared harmless in the works of Miller and Stokes and their followers in the study of constituency influence, are revealed to be problematic when certain conditions hold:

(1) *Citizens have limited information about the consequences of policy*. Of course in some sense this holds in all kinds of democracies and about all kinds of policies. The work of Donald Stokes and others of the Michigan school taught us that many voters know next to nothing about the policies taken by governments or proposed by candidates, much less the consequences these policies would have. Yet the policies being described here are particularly shrouded in uncertainty: these are major transformations, involving complex chains of causality through the economy, the effects of which will depend on myriad variables the behavior of which is itself difficult to predict (for a particular version of this uncertainty, see Fernández and Rodrik, 1991). It seems safe to say that the consequences of exchange rate unification or trade liberalization are harder for voters to predict than, say, those of civil rights legislation. And it should not surprise us if voters' information and ability to predict the consequences of major economic transformations are limited, given that the ability of experts to predict is hardly perfect. We saw in the Venezuelan experience the drastic errors that highly technical programs can fall into, errors that have been repeated from Mexico to Argentina to Poland.[13]

When people are uncertain about the future effects of policies they may change their mind about them after they have taken effect. The most compelling evidence of people changing their minds is in Peru, where polls revealed skepticism about the effectiveness of shock treatment in bringing down inflation, but when the government's policies proved effective, its approval ratings rose with each reduction of inflation. We would consider people's better-informed, post-policy opinion to better reflect their true interests than their pre-policy, less-informed opinions; and we would therefore regard as representative a politician who was not 'dynamically responsive' to *ex ante* opinion but anticipated the future retrospective judgement of better-informed voters.

Although the authors of 'Constituency Influence in Congress' did not explore the possibility of opinion reversals or 'preference switches,' it is worth noting one of the signal contributions of Donald Stokes in calling attention to the shifting dimensions which form the basis of voters' evaluation of politicians from one election to the next. Much of what politicians do, he insisted, was not to respond to public opinion as already formed but anticipate public opinion of future actions of government. Winning reelection, he reminded us, often depends not on following through on past promises, but on shrewdly selecting new themes that would resonate with voters and cast one's party in the best light. In 'Spatial Models of Party Competition' he wrote

> [T]he space in which political parties compete can be of highly variable structure. Just as the parties may be perceived and evaluated on several dimensions, so the dimensions that are salient to the electorate may change widely over time (Stokes, 1966, p. 168).

The evidence Stokes adduced in support of this variability were the 1948 and 1952 presidential elections in the U.S.:

> Whereas the voter evaluations of 1948 were strongly rooted in the economic and social issues of the New Deal–Fair Deal era, the evaluations of 1952 were based substantially on foreign concerns. A dimension that had touched the motives of the electorate not at all in the Truman election was of great importance in turning the Democratic administration out of power four years later …. [T]he skills of political leaders who must maneuver for public support in a democracy consist partly in knowing what issue dimensions are salient to the electorate or can be made salient by suitable propaganda (D. Stokes, 1966, pp. 168–169).

Stokes replaces the picture of politicians as passively responding to constituent influence with the more realistic one in which politicians drum up issues which they anticipate will help them win votes. He replaces the picture of voters delivering to politicians a 'mandate,' one which will provide the criterion for retrospective evaluation at the next election, with one in which voters' criteria of judgement fluctuate with changing circumstances and in response to the strategies of electioneers. His work did not fully explore the implications of these more complex pictures for our notions democratic representation. But his views are highly suggestive of the inappropriateness of reducing representation to responsiveness.

(2) *The welfare effects of a policy on constituents are contingent on the actions of others, whose policy preferences are at odds with those of constituents*. Miller and Stokes recognized that the behavior of members of Congress was shaped by other forces in addition to constituent opinion. They wrote, "*some* constituency influence would not imply that the Representative's behavior is *wholly* determined by constituency pressures …. The constituency can exercise a genuine measure of control without driving all other influences from the Representative's life space" (Miller and Stokes, 1966, p. 361, n.13). It would be natural to consider that this other-than-constituent influence does not interfere with representation as long as the will of non-constituent actors was not preponderant or sharply at odds with the will of constituents. And it would be equally natural to infer that when non-constituent influence sends legislators' behavior in the opposite direction from that desired by constituents, representation is imperiled. Consider a liberal congressional district in which attitudes run strongly in favor of gun control. The Representative from the district is subjected to pressure from the National Rifle Association, and votes to reduce controls on the purchase of firearms. Here there is a zero-sum quality to the influence of constituents and of non-constituents. And to the extent that the Representative is responsive to the latter she is less representative of the former.

This zero-sum quality is mitigated when non-constituents are able to undermine constituent welfare and will do so if the government's policies fail to reflect their own preferences. Voters in Peru and Argentina elected politicians who promised a gradualist approach to inflation stabilization, higher wages, and jobs. When these candidates won, markets, already unstable, reacted by putting loans on hold, shifting out of domestic assets, and betting against the currency. This market response threatened price stability, wages, and jobs. Had politicians not acted to reassure markets, the 'market strike' might well have undermined the very goals voters held in electing the welfare-oriented politicians in the first place.

This should not be construed as an argument for absolute 'structural dependence' of the state in capitalist societies, a state that can do nothing that encroaches on the interests of capital; we know such absolute dependence to be false, both empirically and formally (see Przeworski and Wallerstein, 1988; Przeworski, 1985). Nor should it be construed as a justification of the actions of the particular governments discussed here in pulling back from their mandates when markets appeared to demand it. Whether or not the policies they adopted maximized citizen welfare given the constraints imposed by markets is a question that is difficult to answer. What is clear is that politicians acted under substantial pressure from markets, and they believed, not implausibly, that the best interests of citizens (and hence their own political prospects) lay in placating markets.

Back to Burke?

Miller and Stokes opened their pathbreaking study by acknowledging the normative ambiguity of the phenomenon they studied, citizen influence over their representatives. They rightly attributed to Edmund Burke the position that representation meant not responsiveness to constituents' will but to their interest; in fact Burke would not have looked favorably on the representation of the interests of a constituency, wedded as he was to the notion of a 'national interest', or other disembodied interests (trading interests, agricultural interests) as the appropriate object of representation.[14] In arguing for a conceptual distinction between responsiveness and representation, I have also distinguished will—preferences, opinions—from interest. And yet the lesson to be drawn from the Latin American experiences is not that we should return to Burke's idea that the people are an unreliable judge of their own interests. Rather the view emerging here is perfectly consistent with the liberal one that undergirds many of our democratic institutions, elections among them. The people should be empowered to select their leaders after judging the effectiveness of the past actions of governments and after listening to alternative proposals for the future, and leaders should be free of institutionalized imperatives to carry out their mandates (Manin, 1997).

Burke believed that to the extent that representative government actually represented, it did so because it was staffed by a natural aristocracy of leaders. Most people in any nation, uncultivated in the matter of rational collective decision-making, were incapable of perceiving the true interests, and would, if given a position of leadership, succumb to passing whims and confuse their own parochial concerns for the greater good. In contrast it is axiomatic in the liberal tradition that individuals are not only capable of reasoned decisions but that they are the best judges of their own interest. As Pitkin explains, this means that when the people are in error regarding their interests there will be clear reasons why this is so, such as that they lack information or misconstrue the significance of an issue (Pitkin, 1967, 164 ff.). Therefore in the liberal democratic framework we do not expect citizens' opinions to be regularly at odds with their interests; and we do not expect their representatives to habitually take actions at odds with their constituents' will. Such an assessment accords well with the Latin American experiences recorded here. To the extent that citizens' *ex ante* economic policy preferences were reversed *ex post*, this was because their later preferences were formulated with the advantage of knowledge of the effects of these policies. And the politicians who were trying to represent them (if for no reason more lofty than to promote their future electoral prospects) by ignoring their mandates fully expected to face the retrospective judgement of voters in the future, and hoped that voters would find the government's unresponsive course of action to have been in their best interest.

If people usually know what's best for them, and if therefore governments usually represent by being responsive to the people's will, how necessary is the distinction that I have been arguing for between responsiveness and representation? In fact it is necessary. The conditions identified here which opened up a gap between the will of the majority and its interests are endemic to democracy, even if they are more commonly found in some democracies than in others. Peru, Argentina, and Venezuela are not the only democracies where politicians sometimes ignore their mandates. Casual observation indicates drastic and early policy switches in West Germany (1976), the United States (1990), France (1995), Australia (1983), and New Zealand (1984) (on the last two, see Nagle, 1996). The dependence of citizens' welfare on the behavior of other actors, actors with preferences at odds with the majority's and whose behavior and preferences are not transparent to the majority, is a feature of a growing number of capitalist democracies in an increasingly interdependent world. And in any democracy, some government actions will have consequences that are not *ex ante* fully predictable. The distinction between representation and responsiveness is an important one to retain as we study government actions in the full range of democracies, even if the distinction will not always shed light on the relation of governors to governed.

Notes

1. Research supported by Nation Science Foundation grant SBR-9617796, and by the SSRC-MacArthur Program in International Peace and Security.
2. Miller and Stokes studied the impact of constituency opinion on the roll-call behavior of Representatives from their districts. The focus of my study is quite different: the relation between voters' opinions and the actions of governments, more narrowly of presidents. This approach reflects the institutions of Latin American democracies. In most, legislatures are elected from large multi-member districts and seats are apportioned by proportional representation. The 'responsible parties' model of legislative representation is more appropriate in this context than one linking the behavior of individual representatives with the opinions of their constituents. Recent studies of party discipline in Latin American legislatures shed light on the responsibility of parties; see, for example, Figueiredo and Limongi (1997). But in many countries national legislatures are deprived of the leading role in law-making characteristic of the U.S. Congress, both by constitutional design and by the *de facto* encroachments of presidents. Hence my focus on executive behavior.
3. Only one woman ran for president, Violeta Chamorro of Nicaragua in 1990. Chamorro, who won and served as president from 1990 to 1996, ran on what I am calling an efficiency-oriented program and implemented that program.
4. The notion that Latin American presidential elections represented any sort of 'mandate' for policies relies on the view that voters responded in part to campaign policy positions in deciding for whom to vote, and not simply to candidates' party, class, or ethnic, identity, or to symbolic and affective impulses. This notion is not an unexamined assumption in the larger project of which this article is a part, although it is not examined in depth here. Survey data from several countries support the view that policy positions were an important factor in voters' decisions, as does the fact that when politicians changed policies, they often elicited an immediate, negative reaction, both in polls and

on the streets. Such a reaction would not be predicted if voters had simply supported candidates as members of a party, or class, or ethnic group.

5. In one post-election poll, 46% of lower-class respondents who had voted against Vargas Llosa said they opposed him because he "represented the interests of the rich", and another 17% "because of his right-wing ideas". These were the responses of the two poorest groups of respondents to Apoyo's June poll of 300 Lima residents (Apoyo, June 1990). 16% opposed Vargas Llosa because they "didn't trust him or didn't like him", and 5% for "other reasons". Fujimori, in turn, attracted support among urban lower classes and middle classes and among the peasantry.
6. Fujimori's other great triumph was quelling the Sendero Luminoso insurgency. The breaking event in that story was the caputure, in September 1992, of Abimael Guzmán, the leader of Sendero. The effect of this event is difficult to detect in public opinion polls, because it happened four months after the coup, when Fujimori's approval ratings were already sky-high, and didn't contribute to any significant increase (S. Stokes, 1996). Nevertheless it stands to reason that victory over Sendero was a salient feature in Fujimori's public image, one that bouyed his popularity into the mid-1990s.
7. The end of the story is yet to be told for these two remarkable politicians. As of this writing, public opinion in their respective countries has turned against them. In both cases, economic stability and macro-level growth came at the cost of high unemployment, stagnant real wages for many workers, and income concentration (see Berry, 1997). Fujimori's trend toward dictatorial behavior also has angered Peruvians.
8. This heavy burden of incumbency is consistent with the findings of Remmer (1993).
9. Naím eventually agreed to join the cabinet and was a major force in the Great Turnaround. For his views of these events see Naím (1993).
10. The translation of Machiavelli is from Sonnino (Machiavelli, 1996). The excerpts are from chapters XXVI and VI. Dromi's rendering in Spanish differs in some details from Sonnino's.
11. Julia Alsogaray, a UcéDé Senator and daughter of the party's presidential candidate, Alvaro Alsogaray, was named by Menem to oversee the privatization of Entel, the state telecommunications company, as well as to other posts. Octavio Frigerio was named chairman of the Yacimientos Petrolíferos Fiscales (YPF), the state oil company. Frigerio's father had attempted to privatize YPF during the Frondizi government in the 1950s.
12. Presidential term-limits might be expected to encourage short time-horizons and policy switches. Analysis of the cross-national dataset reveals no significant impact of term limits on the probability of a switch. See Stokes (1998); see also Carey (1996).
13. If politicians were uncertain about the impact of neoliberal reforms on welfare, is it reasonable to argue, as I have, that many switched to these reforms in an effort to represent citizens' interests? In the area of economic policy, they faced considerable uncertainty no matter what they did. The critical point is that market pressures led them to believe that pro-market reforms were less risky than a program consistent with their own campaign slogans. That is, by the politicians' calculus the expected utility to voters of neoliberalism reforms was higher than the expected utility of welfare policies.
14. The interpretation of Burke offered here relies heavily on Hannah Pitkin's *The Concept of Representation* (Pitkin, 1967), just as Miller and Stokes's comments on Burke relied on Pitkin's dissertation.

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